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Abstract
We revisit mean-risk portfolio selection in a one-period financial market where risk is
quantified by a positively homogeneous risk measure ρ on L1. We first show that under
mild assumptions, the set of optimal portfolios for a fixed return is nonempty and compact.
However, unlike in classical mean-variance portfolio selection, it can happen that no efficient
portfolios exist. We call this situation regulatory arbitrage, and prove that it cannot be
excluded – unless ρ is as conservative as the worst-case risk measure.
After providing a primal characterisation, we focus our attention on coherent risk mea-
sures, and give a necessary and sufficient characterisation for regulatory arbitrage. We show
that the presence or absence of regulatory arbitrage for ρ is intimately linked to the interplay
between the set of equivalent martingale measures (EMMs) for the discounted risky assets
and the set of absolutely continuous measures in the dual representation of ρ. A special
case of our result shows that the market does not admit regulatory arbitrage for Expected
Shortfall at level α if and only if there exists an EMM Q ≈ P such that ‖dQdP ‖∞ < 1α .
Mathematics Subject Classification (2020): 91G10, 90C46
JEL Classification: G11, D81, C61
Keywords: portfolio selection, coherent risk measures, dual characterisation, regulatory arbi-
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1 Introduction
It has been widely argued that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a result of excessive risk-
taking by banks; see e.g. [21, 44]. Consequently, the financial regulators have tried to impose
better risk constraints on financial institutions, which for the banking sector are codified in the
Basel accords. One of the key changes from Basel II to Basel III was updating the ‘official’ risk
measure from Value at Risk (VaR) to Expected Shortfall (ES) in the hope of better financial
regulation; cf. the discussion in [28].
While Basel III is probably a step in the right direction, the following questions must be
asked: Does an ES constraint really prevent banks from taking excessive risk?1 And if not,
are there alternative coherent risk measures that are superior? In this paper we address these
questions by revisiting the problem of portfolio optimisation in a one-period financial market –
replacing the variance in the classical theory of Markowitz [32] by a positively homogeneous risk
measure ρ, with ES a key example. We refer to this as mean-ρ portfolio selection in the sequel.
∗The authors are grateful to John Armstrong for fruitful discussions.
†University of Warwick, Department of Statistics, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK, email m.herdegen@warwick.ac.uk.
‡University of Warwick, Department of Statistics, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK, email nazem.khan@warwick.ac.uk.
1For a thorough discussion of other “unexpected shortfalls” of ES we refer to [28].
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
05
49
8v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.M
F]
  1
1 S
ep
 20
20
Mean-VaR portfolio selection was first studied by Alexander and Baptista [5] for multivariate
normal returns distributions, where all quantities can be calculated explicitly. Mean-ES portfolio
selection was first studied by Rockafellar and Uryasev [36] for continuous returns distributions.
They showed that the optimisation problem could be reduced to linear programming. Subse-
quently, the results of [36] were extended to general returns distributions by the same authors in
[40] and later generalised to spectral risk measures by Adam et al. [2]. We generalise the above
results by studying mean-ρ portfolio selection for positively homogeneous (but not necessarily
convex) risk measures ρ. This allows us among others to also consider Value at Risk. In partic-
ular, we prove existence of optimal portfolios (Theorem 3.11) without assuming convexity of ρ
under minimal assumptions on the return distribution and the risk measure.
Unlike in classical mean-variance portfolio selection (and even if optimal portfolios exist),
it can happen that mean-ρ portfolio selection is ill-posed in the sense that there are no effi-
cient portfolios or even worse that for each portfolio pi, there is another portfolio pi′ that has
simultaneously a higher expected return and a lower risk. Motivated by the idea that the risk
measure is imposed by the regulator, we refer to these situations as regulatory arbitrage and
strong regulatory arbitrage respectively.2
The occurrence of regulatory arbitrage was first recognised by Alexander and Baptista [5] for
VaR, who considered multivariate normal returns distributions and gave necessary and sufficient
conditions for the absence of regulatory arbitrage in this setup. Rockafellar et al. [38] recognised
the occurrence of regulatory arbitrage for a wide class of coherent risk measures, noting that
minimising the risk subject to an inequality constraint on the expected return may fail to have
a solution. They called this phenomenon an “acceptably free lunch”, but the main focus of
their paper was the study of deviation risk measures (and the part on risk minimisation did not
make it into the published version [39]).3 Around the same time, the occurrence of regulatory
arbitrage for ES was noted by De Giorgi [15] in the case of elliptical returns distributions, and
subsequently been observed in a simulation study by Kondor et al. [29]. The latter paper led
to a more detailed study by Ciliberti et al. [14], who concluded that there is a phase transition,
i.e., for small values of α, mean-ES portfolio selection is well-posed, and from a certain critical
value α∗ onwards, mean-ES portfolio selection becomes ill-posed. For example, if returns are
multivariate normal distributed and the maximal Sharpe ratio that can be attained in the market
is 2.5, then α∗ ≈ 0.016 – which is below the 2.5% of the Basel III accord; cf. Example 3.27 below
for details. More recently, Armstrong and Brigo [7] argued that VaR and ES constraints may be
void for behavioural investors with an S-shaped utility. In a recent preprint [6] they also studied
regulatory arbitrage (what they call ρ-arbitrage) for general coherent risk measures, focusing on
multivariate normal returns and looking at the issue from a numerical/statistical perspective.
A different strand of literature closely related to strong regulatory arbitrage is the notion of
a good deal ; see e.g. [26].4 For expectation bounded risk measures (cf. Remark 4.10),5 the two
concepts are indeed equivalent if we define a good deal as Cherny in [12], who proves a dual
characterisation of no good deals. However, Cherny’s result only applies to strong regulatory
arbitrage. There is a subtle, yet crucial difference between the two concepts: Strong regulatory
arbitrage is a generalisation of arbitrage of the second kind whereas regulatory arbitrage is a
2The term ‘regulatory arbitrage’ has been emphasised in the literature more intensively since 2004 as explained
in [43]. However, there is no universal definition for this concept. The general consensus is that it is a notion
that refers to actions performed by financial institutions to avoid unfavourable regulation.
3A deviation risk measure D is a generalisation of the standard deviation, and has been axiomatically studied
in [39]. Mean-D portfolio selection has first been studied by Tasche [42] and Bertsimas et al. [10] who looked at
the special case that D is Expected Shortfall Deviation. Their results were later extended to general deviation
risk measures by Rockafellar et al. [37], who showed existence (and non-uniqueness) of optimal portfolios, proved
existence of efficient portfolios and provided a full characterisation of the efficient frontier.
4In the conclusion section, [26] raise the question: “What parts of Markovitz’ theory carry over, what is
different in (µ, ρ)-optimisation?” (p. 199)
5Note that Value at Risk is not expectation bounded, so that this restrictions is practically relevant.
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generalisation of arbitrage of the first kind; cf. Section 6.1. As arbitrage of the first kind is more
important than arbitrage of the second kind, regulatory arbitrage seems to be more important
than strong regulatory arbitrage.
The goal of this paper is to provide under minimal assumptions a complete and rigorous
treatment of mean-ρ portfolio selection and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the
absence of regulatory arbitrage for coherent risk measures ρ who admit a dual representation
(Theorem 4.17). This is very delicate as it requires to find the right concept of “interior” for the
dual set of absolutely continuous measures in the dual characterisation of ρ. While our proof
techniques are rather elementary, the ensuing results are not. Indeed, as a by-product of our
main result, we get a refined version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing in a one-period
market: for returns in L1, there exists an EMM Q whose Radon Nikodým derivative is uniformly
bounded away from 0 (Theorem 6.2).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe our financial market
model. Section 3 is devoted to a rigorous study of mean-ρ portfolio selection, which to the best
of our knowledge has not been carried out at this level of generality in the literature before.
As an example we provide a full characterisation of the absence of (strong) regulatory arbitrage
for elliptical returns in terms of the Sharpe ratio of portfolios (which has some non-obvious
pitfalls; cf. Remark 3.26). In Section 4 we state and prove our main results on the dual
characterisations of the absence of (strong) regulatory arbitrage. Section 5 is devoted to the
case that returns lie in some Orlicz space LΦ. Section 6 contains a large variety of examples and
Section 7 concludes. Appendix A provides various counterexamples to complement our results
and Appendix B contains some additional results.
2 Model
We consider a one-period (1 + d)-dimensional market (S0t , . . . , Sdt )t∈{0,1} on some probability
space (Ω,F ,P). We assume that S0 is riskless and satisfies S00 = 1 and S01 = 1 + r, where
r > −1 denotes the riskless rate. We further assume that S1, . . . , Sd are risky assets, where
S10 , . . . , S
d
0 > 0 and S11 , . . . , Sd1 are real-valued F-measurable random variables. We denote the
(relative) return of asset i ∈ {0, . . . , d} by
Ri :=
Si1 − Si0
Si0
,
and set S := (S1, . . . , Sd) and R := (R1, . . . , Rd) for notational convenience.
We may assume without loss of generality that the market is nonredundant in the sense
that
∑d
i=0 ϑ
iSi = 0 P-a.s. implies that ϑi = 0 for all i ∈ {0, . . . , d}. We also impose that the
risky returns R1, . . . , Rd are P-integrable, which is a minimum requirement for mean-ρ portfolio
selection. Thus, each asset i ∈ {0, . . . , d} has a finite expected return µi := E[Ri], and we set
µ := (µ1, . . . , µd) ∈ Rd. Finally, we may assume without loss of generality that the risky returns
are nondegenerate in the sense that for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, µi 6= r.6 Note that this implies
that P itself is not an equivalent martingale measure for the discounted risky assets S/S0.
2.1 Portfolios
As S00 , . . . , Sd0 > 0, we can parametrise trading in fractions of wealth, and we assume that trading
is frictionless. More precisely, we fix an initial wealth x0 > 0 and describe any portfolio (for
this initial wealth) by a vector pi = (pi1, . . . , pid) ∈ Rd, where pii denotes the fraction of wealth
invested in asset i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. The fraction of wealth invested in the riskless asset is in turn
6 Indeed, if µi = r for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, then every portfolio pi ∈ Rd has zero expected excess return. There
would be no incentive to invest and mean-risk portfolio optimisation becomes meaningless.
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given by pi0 := 1 −∑di=1 pii = 1 − pi · 1, where 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rd. The return of a portfolio
pi ∈ Rd can be computed by7
Rpi := (1− pi · 1)r + pi ·R,
and the excess return of a portfolio pi ∈ Rd over the riskless rate r is in turn given by
Xpi := Rpi − r = (1− pi · 1)r + pi ·R− r = pi · (R− r1). (2.1)
Note that Xapi+bpi′ = aXpi + bXpi′ for any portfolios pi, pi′ ∈ Rd and any constants a, b ∈ R. The
expected excess return of a portfolio pi ∈ Rd over the riskless rate r can be calculated as
E[Xpi] = pi · (µ− r1).
For fixed ν ∈ R, we set
Πν := {pi ∈ Rd : E[Xpi] = ν}, (2.2)
i.e., Πν denotes the set of all portfolios with expected excess return ν. By nondegeneracy, Πν 6= ∅
for all ν ∈ R.8 Moreover, it is easy to check that Πν is closed and convex for each ν ∈ R. Finally,
the definition of Πν in (2.2) implies that
Πk =
{
kΠ1 := {kpi : pi ∈ Π1}, if k > 0,
(−k)Π−1 := {−kpi : pi ∈ Π−1}, if k < 0.
(2.3)
In the following, we will only focus on nonnegative excess returns.
3 Mean-ρ portfolio selection
As Πν 6= ∅ for all ν ∈ R, it is clear that in order to study portfolio selection, some kind
of risk constraint has to be imposed. In the classical mean-variance approach pioneered by
Markowitz [32], risk is measured by variance. Here we follow the axiomatic approach of Artzner
et al. [8] and focus on a positively homogeneous monetary measure of risk ρ : L1 −→ (−∞,∞],
which satisfies the axioms:
• Monotonicity : For any X1, X2 ∈ L1 such that X1 ≤ X2 P-a.s., ρ(X1) ≥ ρ(X2).
• Cash invariance: If X ∈ L1 and c ∈ R, then ρ(X + c) = ρ(X)− c.
• Positive homogeneity: For all X ∈ L1 and λ ≥ 0, ρ(λX) = λρ(X).
Remark 3.1. Note that monotonicity of ρ is not used in any of the results of this section.
We recall the definition of the two most prominent examples of risk measures satisfying the
above axioms, Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall. More examples are given in Section 6.
Definition 3.2. Let α ∈ (0, 1) be a confidence level and X ∈ L1 .
• The Value at Risk (VaR) of X at confidence level α is given by
VaRα(X) := inf{m ∈ R : P[m+X < 0] ≤ α}.
• The Expected Shortfall (ES) of X at confidence level α is given by
ESα(X) :=
1
α
∫ α
0
VaRu(X) du.
7Note that the (relative) return of a portfolio does not depend on the initial wealth x0.
8Indeed, ν(µ−r1)
(µ−r1)·(µ−r1) ∈ Πν for each ν ∈ R.
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We start our discussion on mean-ρ portfolio selection by introducing a partial preference
order on the set of portfolios. This preference order formalises the idea that return is “desirable”
and risk is “undesirable”.
Definition 3.3. A portfolio pi ∈ Rd is strictly ρ-preferred over another portfolio pi′ ∈ Rd if
E[Xpi] ≥ E[Xpi′ ] and ρ(Xpi) ≤ ρ(Xpi′), with at least one inequality being strict.
Remark 3.4. Linearity of the expectation and cash-invariance of ρ imply that a portfolio
pi ∈ Rd is strictly ρ-preferred over another portfolio pi′ ∈ Rd if and only if E[Rpi] ≥ E[Rpi′ ] and
ρ(Rpi) ≤ ρ(Rpi′), with at least one inequality being strict. This equivalent formulation might
seem more natural from an economic perspective. However, it turns out that working with
excess returns is mathematically more convenient.9
3.1 Optimal portfolios
We approach the problem of mean-ρ portfolio selection by first looking at the slightly simplified
problem of finding the minimum risk portfolio given a fixed excess return. Since a negative
excess return corresponds to an expected loss, we only focus on portfolios with nonnegative
expected excess returns.
Definition 3.5. Let ν ≥ 0. A portfolio pi ∈ Rd is called ρ-optimal for ν if ρ(Xpi) < ∞ and
ρ(Xpi) ≤ ρ(Xpi′) for all pi′ ∈ Πν . We denote the set of all ρ-optimal portfolios for ν by Πρν .
Moreover, we set
ρν := inf{ρ(Xpi) : pi ∈ Πν} ∈ [−∞,∞], 10 (3.1)
and define the ρ-optimal boundary by
Oρ := {(ρν , ν) : ν ≥ 0} ⊂ [−∞,∞]× [0,∞).
As the riskless portfolio has zero risk, ρ0 ≤ 0. Positive homogeneity implies that either
ρ0 = −∞ (in which case Πρ0 = ∅) or ρ0 = 0 (in which case 0 ∈ Πρ0). For ν > 0, positive
homogeneity gives Πρν = νΠρ1 and ρν = νρ1. Thus, the ρ-optimal boundary is given by
Oρ = {(ρ0, 0)} ∪ {(kρ1, k) : k > 0}, (3.2)
where ρ0 ∈ {−∞, 0} and ρ1 ∈ [−∞,∞]. Note that the ρ-optimal boundary is nonempty even
if ρ-optimal portfolios do not exist. Depending on the sign of ρ1, Figure 1 gives a graphical
illustration of the three different shapes Oρ can take when ρ0 = 0 and ρ1 ∈ R.
9One might also wonder why we apply ρ to the (relative) return of a portfolio rather than the absolute return
x0Rpi or the final cash value x0(Rpi + 1). As ρ is cash-invariant and positive homogeneous, this does not matter
since in each case we get exactly the same preference order as in Definition 3.3. We note in passing that if we drop
the assumption of positive homogeneity, this is no longer true and one has to be much more careful in thinking
about which quantity the risk measure should be applied to.
10If ρν = −∞, since ρ can only take values in (−∞,∞], for every portfolio in Πν there is another portfolio in
Πν with strictly lower risk. Thus, Πρν = ∅. If ρν =∞, every portfolio in Πν has infinite risk, and so Πρν = ∅.
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Figure 1: General shapes of the ρ-optimal boundary when ρ0 = 0 and ρ1 ∈ R
We now seek to understand under which conditions ρ-optimal portfolios exist and which
properties ρ-optimal sets have. First, we consider the case ν = 0, which is also of key importance
for the case ν > 0.
Proposition 3.6. Πρ0 6= ∅ if and only if ρ0 = 0. Moreover in this case, either Πρ0 = {0} or Πρ0
fails to be compact.
Proof. If ρ0 = 0, then 0 ∈ Πρ0. If ρ0 6= 0, then ρ0 = −∞ and Πρ0 = ∅. Moreover, if ρ0 = 0 and
there is pi 6= 0 with ρ(Xpi) = 0, it follows from positive homogeneity that λpi ∈ Πρ0 for all λ ≥ 0
and hence Πρ0 fails to be compact.
We proceed to provide sufficient conditions that guarantee ρ0 = 0 or even Π
ρ
0 = {0}.
Definition 3.7. A risk measure ρ : L1 → (−∞,∞] is called expectation bounded if ρ(X) ≥
E [−X] for all X ∈ L1. It is called strictly expectation bounded if ρ(X) > E [−X] for all non-
constant X ∈ L1.
Remark 3.8. (a) (Strict) expectation boundedness is a natural requirement on a risk measure
that is satisfied by Expected Shortfall and a large class of coherent risk measures; see [39] for
details and cf. also Remark 4.1(d) and Proposition 4.8.
(b) Value at Risk is not expectation bounded (apart from degenerate probability spaces). For
example, if Z is a standard normal random variable, then VaRα(Z) < 0 = E [−Z] for α > 1/2.
This failure of expectation boundedness for Value at Risk has some undesirable consequences
like the non-existence of optimal portfolios; cf. Remark 3.26.
(c) By cash-invariance of ρ, it suffices to consider X ∈ L1 with E [X] = 0 in the definition of
(strict) expectation boundedness.
We proceed to show that under (strict) expectation boundedness of ρ, optimal portfolios for
ν = 0 exist (and are unique).
Corollary 3.9. If ρ is expectation bounded, then ρ0 = 0. If ρ is even strictly expectation
bounded, then Πρ0 = {0}.
Proof. If ρ is expectation bounded, then for any pi ∈ Π0, ρ(Xpi) ≥ E[−Xpi] = 0 and we may
conclude that ρ0 = 0. If ρ is strictly expectation bounded, fix pi ∈ Π0 \ {0}. Then Xpi is non-
constant by nonredundancy of the financial market. Strict expectation boundedness of ρ gives
ρ(Xpi) > E[−Xpi] = 0. We may conclude that Πρ0 = {0}.
We next consider ρ-optimal sets for ν > 0. To this end, we recall the Fatou property for ρ.
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Definition 3.10. Let X ⊂ L1. The risk measure ρ is said to satisfy the Fatou property on X if
Xn
a.s.−−→ X for Xn, X ∈ X and |Xn| ≤ Y for some Y ∈ L1 implies ρ(X) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Xn).
We now come to our main result of this section, which establishes existence of ρ-optimal
portfolios under very weak assumptions on ρ, only requiring that ρ satisfies the Fatou property
on X := {Xpi : pi ∈ Rd} and Πρ0 = {0}. In particular, we do not require ρ to be convex, which
is a key assumption in the extant literature; see e.g. [37, Proposition 4].
Theorem 3.11. Assume that Πρ0 = {0}, ρ1 ∈ R and ρ satisfies the Fatou property on X :=
{Xpi : pi ∈ Rd}. Then for any ν ≥ 0, the set Πρν of ρ-optimal portfolios for ν is nonempty and
compact.
Proof. The key idea of the proof is to consider the function fρ : Rd → [0,∞], defined by
fρ(pi) =
{
ρ(Xpi) + (|ρ1|+ 1)E[Xpi], if pi ∈ ∪k≥0Πk,
∞, if pi ∈ ∪k<0Πk.
Then fρ is a nonnegative, positively homogeneous function and satisfies f−1ρ ({0}) = {0}. More-
over, if pin → pi in Rd, we have E[Xpi] = limn→∞ E[Xpin ] as well as ρ(Xpi) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Xpin)
because ρ satisfies the Fatou property on X . This implies that fρ is lower semi-continuous.
We proceed to show that fρ has compact sublevel sets. As ρ1 < ∞, there is at least one
portfolio pi∗ ∈ Π1 with ρ(Xpi∗) < ∞. Let S = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖2 = ‖pi∗‖2}. As S is compact
and fρ lower semi-continuous, m := min{fρ(x) : x ∈ S} is well defined. Note that m > 0 since
‖pi∗‖2 > 0 and f−1pi ({0}) = {0}. As fρ is positively homogeneous, fρ(pi) ≥ m‖pi∗‖2 ‖pi‖2 for any
portfolio pi ∈ Rd. Thus, fρ has bounded sublevel sets, which are also closed since fρ is lower
semi-continuous.
We finish by a standard argument. For δ ≥ 0, set Aδ := {pi ∈ Rd : fρ(pi) ≤ δ} ∩ Π1 and
δ1 := inf{fρ(pi) : pi ∈ Π1}. Note that δ1 < ∞ since ρ1 ∈ R. Moreover, each Aδ is compact and
nonempty for δ > δ1. As the Aδ are nested (i.e., Aδ ⊂ Aδ′ for δ ≤ δ′), it follows that
Πρ1 = Aδ1 =
⋂
δ>δ1
Aδ
is nonempty and compact. Whence, so is Πρν = νΠρ1 for any ν > 0. (For ν = 0, the claim is
trivial.)
Remark 3.12. (a) The requirement that ρ satisfies the Fatou property on X is a mild assump-
tion, which is satisfied by VaR and ES. Anticipating ourselves a bit, we note that it is satisfied by
any risk measure ρ : L1 −→ (−∞,∞] admitting a dual representation ρ(X) = supZ∈Q(E[−ZX])
for some nonempty set Q of Radon-Nikodým derivatives satisfying ZRi ∈ L1 for all Z ∈ Q and
i ∈ {1, . . . , d}; cf. Proposition 4.2.
(b) By Corollary 3.9, the requirement that Πρ0 = {0} is automatically satisfied if ρ is strictly
expectation bounded.
(c) If ρ is in addition convex, i.e., ρ(λX1+(1−λ)X2) ≤ λρ(X1)+(1−λ)ρ(X2) forX1, X2 ∈ L1
and λ ∈ [0, 1], then we also have convexity of ρ-optimal sets. Indeed, let ν ≥ 0, pi, pi′ ∈ Πρν ,
and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then ρ(Xλpi+(1−λ)pi′) = ρ(λXpi + (1 − λ)Xpi′) ≤ λρ(Xpi) + (1 − λ)ρ(Xpi′) = ρν .
Therefore, λpi + (1− λ)pi′ ∈ Πρν .
(d) If |ρ1| = ∞, then Πρν = ∅ for all ν > 0. If ρ1 ∈ R and {0} ( Πρ0, then boundedness of
the sublevel sets is lost (since f−1ρ ({0}) is unbounded) and Πρν can be empty for all ν > 0; see
Example A.1 for a concrete counterexample.
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3.2 Efficient portfolios
We proceed to study the notion of ρ-efficient portfolios, which are defined in analogy to efficient
portfolios in the classical mean-variance sense.
Definition 3.13. A portfolio pi ∈ Rd is called ρ-efficient if E[Xpi] ≥ 0 and there is no other
portfolio pi′ ∈ Rd that is strictly ρ-preferred over pi. We denote the ρ-efficient frontier by
Eρ := {(ρ(Xpi),E[Xpi]) : pi is ρ-efficient} ⊂ R2.
Remark 3.14. (a) If pi ∈ Rd is ρ-efficient, it follows that ρ(Xpi) < ∞. Indeed, if E [Xpi] = 0
and ρ(Xpi) = ∞, then 0 is strictly ρ-preferred over pi, and if E [Xpi] > 0 and ρ(Xpi) = ∞, then
λpi is strictly ρ-preferred over pi for λ > 1.
(b) It follows from (a) that every ρ-efficient portfolio is ρ-optimal.
(c) If ρ is expectation bounded, we may drop the assumption that E[Xpi] ≥ 0 for pi to be
efficient since under expectation boundedness, for any portfolio pi with E [Xpi] < 0, we have
ρ(Xpi) ≥ E [−Xpi] > 0, and so the riskless portfolio 0 is strictly ρ-preferred over pi.
Remark 3.14(b) implies that Eρ ⊆ Oρ. However, unlike in the case of mean-variance portfolio
optimisation, it can happen that there are no ρ-efficient portfolios – even if ρ-optimal portfolios
exist for all ν ≥ 0. The following result shows that when Πρν 6= ∅ for all ν ≥ 0 (which is satisfied
under the conditions of Theorem 3.11), then the existence of the ρ-efficient frontier depends only
on the sign of ρ1.
Proposition 3.15. Assume Πρν 6= ∅ for all ν ≥ 0. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) ρ1 > 0.
(b) Eρ 6= ∅.
Moreover, if ρ1 > 0, the ρ-efficient frontier is given by
Eρ = {(kρ1, k) : k ≥ 0}.
Proof. First assume that ρ1 > 0. We proceed to show that any ρ-optimal portfolio is ρ-efficient.
It then follows from Remark 3.14(b) and Proposition 3.6 that
Eρ = Oρ = {(kρ1, k) : k ≥ 0}.
Seeking a contradiction, let pi ∈ Πρν for some ν ≥ 0 and assume that there is pi′ ∈ Rd such
that E[Xpi′ ] ≥ E[Xpi] = ν and ρ(Xpi′) ≤ ρ(Xpi) = νρ1, with one inequality being strict. Set
ν ′ := E[Xpi′ ]. If ν ′ = ν, then ρ(Xpi′) < ρ(Xpi) and we arrive at a contradiction as pi ∈ Πρν .
Otherwise, if ν ′ > ν, let pi∗ ∈ Πρν′ . Then ν ′ρ1 = ρ(Xpi∗) ≤ ρ(Xpi′) ≤ ρ(Xpi) = νρ1. Since ρ1 > 0,
we arrive at the contradiction that ν ′ > ν and ν ′ ≤ ν.
Now assume that ρ1 ≤ 0. We proceed to show that there does not exist any ρ-efficient
portfolio, even though Πρν 6= ∅ for all ν ≥ 0. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that pi ∈ Rd is
ρ-efficient. Then by Remark 3.14(b), pi ∈ Πρν for some ν ≥ 0. Pick ν ′ > ν and let pi′ ∈ Πρν′ .
Then E[Xpi′ ] = ν ′ > ν = E[Xpi] and ρ(Xpi′) = ν ′ρ1 ≤ νρ1 = ρ(Xpi) by positive homogeneity of ρ
and ρ1 ≤ 0. Hence, pi′ is strictly ρ-preferred over pi and we arrive at a contradiction.
Remark 3.16. A close inspection of the proof of Proposition 3.15 reveals that the equivalence
between (a) and (b) remains true if we only require than Πρν 6= ∅ for all ν > 0. However, if
Πρ0 = ∅, the ρ-efficient frontier is given by Eρ = {(kρ1, k) : k > 0}.11
11It is an open question if there exists a risk measure satisfying Πρν 6= ∅ for all ν > 0 but Πρ0 = ∅. It is clear
that if it exists, ρ fails to be convex.
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The following figure gives a graphical illustration of Proposition 3.15.
Figure 2: ρ-optimal boundary (red) and ρ-efficient frontier (green) when Πρν 6= ∅ for all ν ≥ 0
3.3 Regulatory arbitrage
We have seen above that mean-ρ portfolio selection is not always well defined as it can happen
that there are no ρ-efficient portfolios. We call this situation regulatory arbitrage.
Definition 3.17. The market (S0, S) is said to satisfy regulatory arbitrage for ρ if there are
no ρ-efficient portfolios. It is said to satisfy strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ if for any portfolio
pi ∈ Rd, there exists another portfolio pi′ such that
E[Xpi′ ] > E[Xpi] and ρ(Xpi′) < ρ(Xpi).
It is clear that strong regulatory arbitrage implies regulatory arbitrage but not vice versa.
Remark 3.18. (a) In Section 6.1, we explain how (strong) regulatory arbitrage for the worst-
case risk measure is equivalent to arbitrage of the first (second) kind. In this sense regulatory
arbitrage can be seen as an extension of the ordinary notion of arbitrage.
(b) One might wonder if (strong) regulatory arbitrage is not just a pathology that disappears
for reasonable (i.e., arbitrage-free) markets and risk measures. This is not the case. In fact, we
show in Theorem 6.4 that unless ρ is as conservative as the worst-case risk measure, one can
always construct a financial market that is arbitrage-free but admits strong regulatory arbitrage
for ρ.
The following two results give primal characterisations for strong regulatory arbitrage and
regulatory arbitrage. Whereas strong regulatory arbitrage is fully characterised by the sign of ρ1,
defined in (3.1), the case of regulatory arbitrage is more subtle.
Theorem 3.19. The market (S0, S) admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ iff ρ1 < 0.
Proof. First, assume that the market satisfies strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ. As the riskless
portfolio has zero risk and zero return, by definition of strong regulatory arbitrage, there is a
pi ∈ Rd with E[Xpi] =: ν > 0 and ρ(Xpi) < 0. Let pi′ := 1νpi. Then pi′ ∈ Π1, and
ρ1 ≤ ρ(Xpi′) = 1ν ρ(Xpi) < 0.
Conversely, assume that ρ1 < 0. Then there exists a portfolio pi ∈ Π1 with ρ(Xpi) < 0.
Thus, E[Xkpi] → ∞ and ρ(Xkpi) → −∞ as k → ∞. Therefore, for any portfolio pi′ (recalling
that E[Xpi′ ] ∈ R and ρ(Xpi′) ∈ (−∞,∞]), there exists k ∈ N such that E[Xkpi] > E[Xpi′ ] and
ρ(Xkpi) < ρ(Xpi′). Hence, the market satisfies strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
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Theorem 3.20. We have the following three cases:
(a) If Πρ1 6= ∅, then the market (S0, S) admits regulatory arbitrage for ρ iff ρ1 ≤ 0.
(b) If Πρ1 = ∅ and Πρ0 6= ∅, then the market (S0, S) admits regulatory arbitrage for ρ iff ρ1 < 0.
(c) If Πρ1 = ∅ and Πρ0 = ∅, then the market (S0, S) admits regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
Proof. (a) This follows from Proposition 3.15 and Remark 3.16.
(b) If ρ1 < 0, by Theorem 3.19 the market admits strong regulatory arbitrage and a fortiori
regulatory arbitrage for ρ. Conversely, if ρ1 ≥ 0, any portfolio pi ∈ Rd with E [Xpi] =: ν > 0 has
ρ(Xpi) > νρ1 = 0 because Π
ρ
ν = νΠ
ρ
1 = ∅. Thus, any portfolio in Πρ0 is ρ-efficient because Πρ0 6= ∅
(and therefore ρ0 = 0). Thus, the market does not admit regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
(c) This follows from Remark 3.14(b).
3.4 Regulatory arbitrage for elliptical returns
The primal characterisations of (strong) regulatory arbitrage in Theorems 3.19 and 3.20 are
particularly useful when returns are elliptically distributed with finite second moments and the
risk measure is law invariant. We briefly recall both concepts.
Definition 3.21. An Rd-valued random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xd) has an elliptical distribution
if there exists a location vector µ˜ ∈ Rd, a d×d nonnegative definite dispersion matrix Σ˜ ∈ Rd×d,
and a characteristic generator ψ : [0,∞) → R such that the characteristic function of X, φX
can be expressed as
φX(t) = e
it>µ˜ψ(tT Σ˜t) for all t ∈ Rd.
In this case we write X ∼ E˜d(µ˜, Σ˜, ψ).
Elliptical distributions are generalisations of the multivariate normal distribution, which
allow for heavy tail models while possessing many useful properties. Indeed, the fat tails of most
of their members make them natural candidates in modelling the distribution of speculative
returns. Examples of elliptical distributions include the multivariate normal distribution, the
multivariate t-distribution and the multivariate symmetric Laplace distribution. For a thorough
description of elliptical distributions refer to [22, 31].
Remark 3.22. If X has an elliptical distribution with finite second moments, X is also char-
acterised by its mean vector µ ∈ Rd, covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rd×d and characteristic generator
ψ. Therefore, we may write X ∼ Ed (µ,Σ, ψ); see [33, Remark 3.27] for details.
Definition 3.23. A risk measure ρ : L1 → (−∞,∞] is called law-invariant if ρ(X1) = ρ(X2)
whenever X1, X2 ∈ L1 have the same law.
The following result shows why elliptical distributions and law-invariant risk measures work
particularly nicely together.
Lemma 3.24. Suppose ρ is law-invariant and the return vector R has an elliptical distribution
with mean vector µ ∈ Rd, covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rd×d and characteristic generator ψ. Let
Z ∼ E1 (0, 1, ψ). Then for any portfolio pi ∈ Rd,12
ρ(Xpi) = −E [Xpi] + ρ(Z)
√
Var(Xpi) = −pi>(µ− r1) + ρ(Z)
√
pi>Σpi. (3.3)
Moreover, ρ(Z) is nonnegative (positive) if ρ is (strictly) expectation bounded.
12Note that ρ(Z) ∈ (−∞,∞]. We employ the convention that ∞ × 0 = 0, so that ρ(Xpi) = −E [Xpi] if
Var(Xpi) = 0.
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Proof. Standard properties of elliptical distributions imply that
pi · (R− r1) ∼ E1
(
pi · (µ− r1), piTΣpi, ψ)
for any portfolio pi ∈ Rd. This means that Xpi d=pi>(µ− r1) +Z
√
pi>Σpi, where Z ∼ E1 (0, 1, ψ).
As ρ is a law-invariant, ρ(Xpi) = −pi>(µ− r1) + ρ(Z)
√
pi>Σpi. The final claim follows from the
fact that E [Z] = 0 because Z ∼ E1 (0, 1, ψ) has a symmetric distribution.
With the help of Lemma 3.24, we can give a very simple characterisation for the absence of
(strong) regulatory arbitrage in terms of the maximal Sharpe ratio.
Corollary 3.25. Suppose ρ is law-invariant and the return vector R has an elliptical distribution
with mean vector µ ∈ Rd satisfying µ 6= r1, positive definite covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rd×d and
characteristic generator ψ. Let Z ∼ E1 (0, 1, ψ). Define the maximal Sharpe ratio as
SRmax := max
pi∈Rd\{0}
E [Xpi]√
Var(Xpi)
=
√
(µ− r1)>Σ−1(µ− r1). (3.4)
Then we have the following trichotomy:
(a) If SRmax < ρ(Z), the market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
(b) If SRmax = ρ(Z), the market (S0, S) admits regulatory arbitrage for ρ but does not admit
strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
(c) If SRmax > ρ(Z), the market (S0, S) admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
In particular, if ρ(Z) ≤ 0, the market (S0, S) admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ, indepen-
dent of µ or Σ. Moreover, if ρ(Z) < 0 and d ≥ 2, ρ-optimal portfolios fail to exist for any ν ≥ 0,
independent of µ or Σ.
Proof. For pi ∈ Rd \ {0}, set SRpi := E [Xpi] /
√
Var(Xpi) and note that this is well defined
because µ 6= r1 and Σ is positive definite. It follows from linearity of the expectation and
positive homogeneity of the standard deviation that SRmax := maxpi∈Π1 SRpi. It is not difficult
to check that the portfolio pi∗ := 1
(µ−r1)TΣ−1(µ−r1)Σ
−1(µ − r1) ∈ Π1 has maximal Sharpe ratio
given by the right-hand side of (3.4).
If ρ(Z) ∈ (0,∞), then by Lemma 3.24 for any pi ∈ Π1,
ρ(Xpi) = −1 + ρ(Z)
√
Var(Xpi) = −1 + ρ(Z)SRpi .
Thus, minimising ρ(Xpi) over pi ∈ Π1 is equivalent to maximising SRpi over Π1. Whence
ρ1 := −1 + ρ(Z)SRmax = −1 +
ρ(Z)
SRpi∗
= ρ(Xpi∗).
Parts (a), (b) and (c) now follow from Theorems 3.19 and Theorem 3.20(a).
If ρ(Z) =∞, every portfolio has infinite risk except the riskless portfolio which has zero risk.
Whence Πρ0 = {0}, Πρ1 = ∅ and ρ1 =∞. Now part (a) follow from Theorem 3.20(b).
If ρ(Z) = 0, ρ(Xpi) = −E [Xpi] for every portfolio pi ∈ Rd. Thus, ρν = −ν for any ν ≥ 0 and
the market admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ by Theorem 3.19.
Finally, if ρ(Z) < 0, Lemma 3.24 gives for ν ≥ 0,
ρν = inf
pi∈Πν
ρ(Xpi) = inf
pi∈Πν
(−ν + ρ(Z)
√
Var(Xpi)) = −ν + ρ(Z) sup
pi∈Πν
√
Var(Xpi) < 0,
whence, the market admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ by Theorem 3.19. If d ≥ 2, it is
not difficult to check that suppi∈Πν
√
Var(Xpi) = ∞, and hence ρν = −∞, which implies that
Πρν = ∅.
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Remark 3.26. Corollary 3.25 shows that in general it is not true that for elliptically distributed
returns and a law-invariant risk measure ρ, the ρ-optimal portfolios coincide with the Markowitz
optimal portfolios.13 Indeed, Corollary 3.25 shows that in every elliptical market, VaRα-optimal
portfolios fail to exist if α > P[Z ≤ 0] = 1/2 + 1/2P[Z = 0], where Z ∼ E1 (0, 1, ψ).14 In
particular, VaRα-optimal portfolios fail to exist for α > 1/2 in every multivariate Gaussian
market. The underlying reason is that Value at Risk fails to be expectation bounded.
We illustrate the above result by considering the case that R has multivariate Gaussian
returns and the risk measure is either Value at Risk or Expected Shortfall.
Example 3.27. Assume the return vector R has a multivariate normal distribution with mean
vector µ ∈ Rd satisfying µ 6= r1 and a positive definite covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rd×d. Let
Z ∼ N(0, 1). Then for α ∈ (0, 1), we have
VaRα(Z) = Φ−1(1− α) and ESα(Z) = φ(Φ
−1(α))
α
,
where φ and Φ denote the pdf and cdf of a standard normal distribution, respectively. By
Corollary 3.25, we can fully characterise (strong) regulatory arbitrage in this market for both
risk measures by looking at the maximal Sharpe ratio. Figure 3 gives a graphical illustration.
0 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.1
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Figure 3: Regulatory arbitrage for ES (blue) and VaR (orange), for multivariate normal returns
If SRmax lies above the blue (orange) curve, then this Gaussian market admits strong regula-
tory arbitrage for ESα (VaRα). If it lies below the blue (orange) curve then the market does not
satisfy regulatory arbitrage for ESα (VaRα). And in the intermediate case, the market admits
regulatory arbitrage (but not strong regulatory arbitrage) for ESα (VaRα).
Also note that for Value at Risk, if α > 1/2, then Φ−1(1 − α) < 0. Hence, in this case we
always have strong regulatory arbitrage for VaRα and VaRα-optimal portfolios fail to exist for
d ≥ 2, independent of µ or Σ.
4 Dual characterisation of (strong) regulatory arbitrage
Theorems 3.19 and 3.20 provide a full characterisation of strong regulatory arbitrage and reg-
ulatory arbitrage for ρ, respectively. However, the criterion is rather indirect as it requires to
calculate ρ1, which relies on a nontrivial optimisation problem. In this section, we consider the
13 This is for instance claimed in [20, Theorem 1].
14Note that Z ∼ E1 (0, 1, ψ) has a symmetric distribution.
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case that ρ is in addition convex (and hence coherent) and admits a dual representation. We
then derive a dual characterisation of (strong) regulatory arbitrage.
Let D := {Z ∈ L1 : Z ≥ 0 P-a.s. and E[Z] = 1} be the set of all Radon-Nikodým derivatives
of probability measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to P. Throughout this
section, we assume that ρ : L1 −→ (−∞,∞] is an expectation bounded, coherent risk measure
and admits a dual representation
ρ(X) = sup
Z∈Q
(E[−ZX]), (4.1)
for some Q ⊂ D. Since ρ is expectation bounded, we may assume without loss of generality that
1 ∈ Q. Moreover, taking the supremum over Q is equivalent to taking the supremum over its
convex hull, and therefore, we may assume without loss of generality that Q is convex.
Remark 4.1. (a) Since −ZX may not be integrable, we define E[−ZX] := E[ZX−]−E[ZX+],
with the conservative convention that if E[ZX−] =∞, then E[−ZX] =∞.
(b) Apart from the (natural) assumption that ρ is expectation bounded, this is the most
general class of coherent risk measures on L1 that admit a dual representation. For instance, we
do not impose L1-closedness or uniformly integrability of Q (which is for instance assumed in
[12]). A wide range of examples of risk measures satisfying (4.1) are given in Sections 5 and 6.
(c) The representation in (4.1) is not unique. However, it is not difficult to check that the
maximal dual set for which (4.1) is satisfied is given by
Qρ := {Z ∈ D : E [ZX] ≥ 0 and E
[
ZX−
]
<∞ for all X ∈ Aρ},
where Aρ := {X ∈ L1 : ρ(X) ≤ 0} is the acceptance set of ρ. However, it turns out that it is
sometimes useful not to consider the maximal dual set; cf. some of the examples in Section 6.
(d) If we define ρ by (4.1) for some convex set Q containing 1, it follows that ρ is (−∞,∞]-
valued, expectation bounded and a coherent risk measure (i.e., it is monotone, cash-invariant,
positively homogeneous and convex). Moreover, if R ⊂ L ⊂ L1 is a subspace and ρ : L →
(−∞,∞] is defined by (4.1) on L, we can naturally extend ρ to an expectation bounded coherent
risk measure on L1 via the right hand side of (4.1).15
4.1 Preliminary considerations and conditions
In this section, we introduce and discuss some additional conditions that are needed (and nec-
essary) for our main results, Theorems 4.12 and 4.17.
We start by introducing two conditions concerning the (uniform) integrability of the returns
under the probability measures “contained” in the dual set Q.
Condition I. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , d} and any Z ∈ Q, ZRi ∈ L1.
Condition UI. Q is uniformly integrable, and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, RiQ is uniformly integrable,
where RiQ := {RiZ : Z ∈ Q}.
While Condition I is quite weak, it has some important consequences.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that Condition I is satisfied. Then the set
CQ := {E[−Z(R− r1)] : Z ∈ Q} (4.2)
is a convex subset of Rd and for any portfolio pi ∈ Rd,
ρ(Xpi) = sup
c∈CQ
(pi · c). (4.3)
Moreover, the risk measure ρ satisfies the Fatou property on X = {Xpi : pi ∈ Rd}.
15Note that this extension is not necessarily unique, i.e., if ρ : L→ (−∞,∞] has the representations (4.1) for
two dual sets Q′ and Q′′ on L, the corresponding extensions ρ′ and ρ′′ to L1 may not coincide on L1.
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Proof. The set CQ is real valued by Condition I and convex by convexity of Q. This together
with linearity of the expectation implies that
ρ(Xpi) = sup
Z∈Q
(E[−ZXpi]) = sup
Z∈Q
(E[−Z(pi · (R− r1))]) = sup
c∈CQ
(pi · c).
Finally, to establish the Fatou property on X = {Xpi : pi ∈ Rd}, assume that Xpin → Xpi P-a.s.
Nondegeneracy of the market implies that pin → pi ∈ Rd. Then for any Z ∈ Q, Condition I,
linearity of the expectation and the definition of ρ in (4.1) gives
E[−ZXpi] = pi · E[−Z(R− r1)] = lim
n→∞pin · E[−Z(R− r1)] = limn→∞E[−ZXpin ] ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Xpin).
Taking the supremum over Z ∈ Q gives us ρ(Xpi) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Xpin).
Remark 4.3. Example A.2 shows that without Condition I, CQ may fail to be convex and (4.3)
may break down.
Condition UI is a uniform version of Condition I.16 The following result shows that under
Condition UI, the supremum in (4.3) can be replaced by a maximum, if we replace Q in (4.2)
by its L1-closure.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that Condition UI is satisfied. Denote by Q¯ the L1-closure of Q.
Then the set
CQ¯ := {E[−Z(R− r1)] : Z ∈ Q¯} (4.4)
is a convex and compact subset of Rd. Moreover, for any portfolio pi ∈ Rd,
ρ(Xpi) = max
c∈CQ¯
(pi · c). (4.5)
Proof. Since Condition UI implies Condition I, (4.3) gives
ρ(Xpi) = sup
c∈CQ
(pi · c) ≤ sup
c∈CQ¯
(pi · c). (4.6)
Since Q is UI and convex, Q¯ is convex and weakly compact by the Dunford-Pettis theorem.
To show that the supremum on the right side of (4.6) is attained, let (Zn)n∈N be a maximising
sequence in Q¯. Since Q¯ is weak sequentially compact by the Eberlein-Šmulian theorem, after
passing to a subsequence, we may assume that Zn converges weakly to some Z ∈ Q¯. Since the
map Z˜ 7→ E[−Z˜(R− r1)] is weakly continuous on Q¯ by Proposition B.2, Z is a maximiser. The
same argument, but now for a maximising sequence in Q ⊂ Q¯, shows that we have have equality
in (4.6). Finally, using again that the map Z˜ 7→ E[−Z˜(R− r1)] is weakly continuous on Q¯ and
Q¯ is weakly compact, it follows that CQ¯ is compact.
Remark 4.5. In [12], it is assumed that Q is uniformly integrable and that Ri ∈ L1(Q), where
L1(Q) := {X ∈ L0 : lim
a→∞ supZ∈Q
E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}] = 0}. (4.7)
By Proposition B.1, this is equivalent to Condition UI. However, we believe that Condition UI
is slightly more natural (and easier to understand) than (4.7).
16Note that Z ∈ L1 for all Z ∈ Q even though this does not appear explicitly in Condition I.
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We next aim to introduce a notion of “interior” for Q, which is crucial for the dual charac-
terisation of regulatory arbitrage. This turns out to be rather subtle since neither algebraic nor
topological notions of interior work in general; cf. Remark 4.6. Instead, we define our notion of
“interior” in an abstract way. More precisely, we look for (nonempty) subsets Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfying
Condition POS. Z˜ > 0 P-a.s. for all Z˜ ∈ Q˜.
Condition MIX. λZ + (1− λ)Z˜ ∈ Q˜ for all Z ∈ Q, Z˜ ∈ Q˜ and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Condition INT. For all Z˜ ∈ Q˜, there is an L∞-dense subset E of D ∩ L∞ such that for all
Z ∈ E , there is λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λZ + (1− λ)Z˜ ∈ Q.
A few comments are in order.
Remark 4.6. (a) Condition MIX implies in particular that Q˜ is convex.
(b) Condition INT of Q˜ is inspired by the definition of the core/algebraic interior. Indeed,
recall that for a vector space V , the algebraic interior of a set M ⊂ V with respect to a vector
subspace X ⊂ V is defined by17
aintXM := {m ∈M : for all x ∈ X, there is λ > 0 such that m+ δx ∈M for all δ ∈ [0, λ]}.
When M is convex, one can show that
aintXM = {m ∈M : for all x ∈ X, there is λ > 0 such that m+ λx ∈M},
and any strict convex combination of a point in M and aintXM belongs to aintXM . To see the
link to our setup, assume that Q ⊂ L∞. SetM := Q, V := L∞ and X := {Z ∈ L∞ : E [Z] = 0}.
Then aintXM satisfies conditions POS, MIX and INT. Moreover, for certain examples (e.g.
Expected Shortfall), aintXM 6= ∅. Note, however, that if Q 6⊂ L∞, it is not possible to define a
nonempty set Q˜ satisfying Conditions POS, MIX and INT via the algebraic interior.
(c) One might wonder if one could define Q˜ as the topological interior of Q in a suitable
subspace topology of D ∩ V , where L∞ ⊂ V ⊂ L1 is a vector subspace. Again if Q ⊂ L∞, for
certain examples (e.g. Expected Shortfall), the topological interior of Q in the subspace topology
of D ∩L∞ is nonempty and satisfies Conditions POS, MIX and INT. However, if Q 6⊂ L∞, this
approach does not work since the topological interior may fail to satisfy Condition MIX (because
D ∩ V is not a vector space).
(d) In light of Propositions 4.8 and B.6 one could slightly relax Condition INT, by requiring
that the sets E are only σ(L∞, L1)-dense in D∩L∞. However, this additional level of generality
does not seem to be useful in concrete examples. However, considering L∞-dense subsets of
D ∩ L∞ is useful; cf. Section 6.3.
We proceed to characterise the maximal subset of Q satisfying Conditions POS, MIX and
INT. This is surprisingly simple and shows that we can expect Q˜max to be nonempty for most
risk measures ρ.
Proposition 4.7. Define the set Q˜max by
Q˜max := {Z˜ > 0 ∈ Q : there is an L∞-dense subset E of D ∩ L∞ such that for all Z ∈ E ,
there is λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λZ + (1− λ)Z˜ ∈ Q}.
Then Q˜max satisfies Conditions POS, MIX and INT. Moreover, if Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfies Conditions
POS, MIX and INT, then Q˜ ⊂ Q˜max.
17We refer the reader to [46] for details. The case that X = V is more standard and called the core/algebraic
interior of M .
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Proof. Q˜max satisfies Conditions POS and INT by definition. To establish Condition MIX, let
Z ∈ Q, Z˜ ∈ Q˜max and µ ∈ (0, 1). Clearly µZ + (1 − µ)Z˜ > 0 P-a.s. It remains to show that
there exists an L∞-dense subset E ′ of D∩L∞ such that for all Z ′ ∈ E ′, there is λ′ > 0 such that
λ′Z ′+(1−λ′)(µZ+(1−µ)Z˜) ∈ Q. Let E be the L∞-dense subset of D∩L∞ for Z˜ in the definition
of Q˜max. Set E ′ := E . Let Z ′ ∈ E ′. Then there is λ > 0 such that λZ ′ + (1− λ)Z˜ ∈ Q˜max ⊂ Q.
Set µ′ := 1−µ1−µλ ∈ (0, 1) and λ′ := λµ′ ∈ (0, 1). Then by convexity of Q,
µ′
(
λZ ′ + (1− λ)Z˜)+ (1− µ′)Z = λ′Z ′ + (1− λ′)(µZ + (1− µ)Z˜) ∈ Q.
The additional claim follows immediately from the definition of Q˜max.
We finish this section by explaining the role of Conditions POS and INT for establishing
existence of ρ-optimal portfolios.
Proposition 4.8. Suppose Condition I is satisfied. Let Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfy Conditions POS and
INT.18 If 1 ∈ Q˜, then ρ is strictly expectation bounded and Πρ0 = {0}. If in addition ρ1 < ∞,
then for all ν ≥ 0, Πρν is nonempty, compact and convex.
Proof. Strict expectation boundedness of ρ follows from Lemma B.3 (with Z˜ = 1) and Re-
mark 3.8(c). Corollary 3.9 then gives Πρ0 = {0}. Finally, if ρ1 <∞, it follows that ρ1 ∈ R since
ρ1 ≥ −1 by expectation boundedness of ρ. Now the remaining claim follows from Proposition
4.2, Theorem 3.11 and Remark 3.12(c).
4.2 Dual characterisation of strong regulatory arbitrage
In this section, we provide a dual characterisation of strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ in terms
of absolutely continuous martingale measures (ACMMs) for the discounted risky assets S/S0.
To this end, set
M = {Z ∈ D : E[Z(Ri − r)] = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , d}, (4.8)
and note that each Z ∈M is the Radon-Nikodým derivative of an ACMM for S/S0.
A first step towards a dual characterisation is the following equivalent characterisation of
strong regulatory arbitrage.
Proposition 4.9. The market (S0, S) satisfies strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ if and only if
ρ(Xpi) < 0 for some portfolio pi ∈ Rd.
Proof. If the market admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ, then ρ1 < 0 by Theorem 3.19.
Hence, ρ(Xpi) < 0 for some portfolio pi ∈ Rd.
Conversely, if ρ(Xpi) < 0 for some portfolio pi, E[Xpi] ≥ −ρ(Xpi) > 0 because 1 ∈ Q. Thus,
ρ1 < 0, and the market satisfies strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
Remark 4.10. The condition ρ(Xpi) < 0 for some pi ∈ Rd is referred to as a Good Deal in the
literature, see e.g. [12]. Note, however, that the equivalence of Proposition 4.9 crucially relies
on ρ being expectation bounded (via 1 ∈ Q) since otherwise a portfolio with negative risk may
have a negative expected excess return.19
Our next result shows that if Q contains an ACMM, the market does not satisfy strong
regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
Proposition 4.11. If Q ∩M 6= ∅, then the market (S0, S) does not admit strong regulatory
arbitrage for ρ.
18Note that Q˜ does not need to satisfy Condition MIX.
19Note that Proposition 4.9 holds more generally for positively homogeneous (not necesarily convex) risk
measures that are expectation bounded. Also note that assuming that ρ is expectation bounded is a real restriction
as it is not satisfied by Value at Risk.
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Proof. Let Z ∈ Q ∩M. Then for any portfolio pi ∈ Rd,
ρ(Xpi) ≥ E[−ZXpi] = 0.
Therefore, by Proposition 4.9 the market does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
The converse of Proposition 4.11 is false. Example A.3 shows that even under Condition I,
Q∩M = ∅ is not enough to imply strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ. However, under condition
UI, the converse of Proposition 4.11 is essentially true.
Theorem 4.12. Assume Q satisfies UI. Denote by Q¯ the L1-closure of Q. The following are
equivalent:
(a) The market (S0, S) does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
(b) Q¯ ∩M 6= ∅.
Proof. First, assume Q¯ ∩ M 6= ∅. Let Z ∈ Q¯ ∩ M. Then Proposition 4.4 gives ρ(Xpi) ≥
E[−ZXpi] = 0 for any pi ∈ Rd. Therefore, the market does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage
for ρ by Proposition 4.9.
Conversely, assume Q¯ ∩M = ∅. By Proposition 4.4, {0} and CQ¯ are two nonempty disjoint
convex and compact subsets of Rd. By the strict separation theorem (cf. [9, Proposition B.14]),
there exists pi ∈ Rd \ {0} with pi · c < b < 0 for all c ∈ CQ¯. Thus, Proposition 4.4 gives
ρ(Xpi) = max
c∈CQ¯
(pi · c) < 0,
and so the market admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ by Proposition 4.9.
Remark 4.13. (a) By virtue of Proposition 4.9, Theorem 4.12 is identical to Cherny’s equivalent
characterisation of No Good Deals in [12, Theorem 3.1]. However, our proof is simpler since
we are working with a finite number of assets. We have included it for the convenience of the
reader.
(b) Example A.4 shows that when Q is uniformly integrable but RQ is not, then Theorem
4.12 is false. Example A.5 shows that Theorem 4.12 is also false if RQ is uniformly integrable
but Q is not. Thus, we need both parts of Condition UI simultaneously.
Characterising the absence of strong regulatory arbitrage is important. However, it is not
enough as the risk constraint also remains void if there is no portfolio with negative risk but a
portfolio pi ∈ Π1 with zero risk. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.14. Consider a binomial model with one riskless asset and one risky asset with
returns r = 0 and R1, respectively, where P[R1 = 1] = P[R1 = 0] = 1/2. Set pi = pi1 := 2. Then
for α ∈ (0, 1), ΠESα1 = {pi} and
ESα1 = ES
α(Xpi) =
{
0, if α ≤ 12
1−2α
α < 0, if α >
1
2 .
Hence, by either Theorem 3.19 or Theorem 4.12, the market does not admit strong regulatory
arbitrage for ESα if α ≤ 12 . However, by Theorem 3.20(a), the market admits regulatory arbitrage
for ESα if α ≤ 12 .
Therefore, to see the whole picture, it is important to also have a dual characterisation of
regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
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4.3 Dual characterisation of regulatory arbitrage
In this section, we provide a dual characterisation of regulatory arbitrage for ρ in terms of
equivalent martingale measures (EMMs) for the discounted risky assets S/S0. To this end, set
P = {Z ∈M : Z > 0 P-a.s.}.
and note that each Z ∈ P is the Radon-Nikodým derivative of an EMM for S/S0.
As we did for strong regulatory arbitrage, we start by providing an equivalent characterisation
of regulatory arbitrage. However, for regulatory arbitrage, we need to assume that 0 is the unique
ρ-optimal portfolio.
Proposition 4.15. Assume Πρ0 = {0}. Then the market (S0, S) satisfies regulatory arbitrage
for ρ if and only if ρ(Xpi) ≤ 0 for some portfolio pi ∈ Rd \ {0}.
Proof. First assume the market satisfies regulatory arbitrage for ρ. As the riskless portfolio 0
has zero risk, by definition of regulatory arbitrage, there must be another portfolio pi ∈ Rd \ {0}
with ρ(Xpi) ≤ 0.
Conversely, if ρ(Xpi) ≤ 0 for some portfolio pi ∈ Rd \ {0}, then E[Xpi] ≥ 0 by expectation
boundedness of ρ, which in turn gives E[Xpi] > 0 by Πρ0 = {0}. Now for any portfolio pi′ ∈ Rd,
pi + pi′ is strictly ρ-preferred over pi′ because
E[Xpi+pi′ ] = E[Xpi] + E[Xpi′ ] > E[Xpi′ ] and ρ(Xpi+pi′) ≤ ρ(Xpi) + ρ(Xpi′) ≤ ρ(Xpi′).
It follows that the market admits regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
We proceed to give a preliminary dual characterisations of regulatory arbitrage for ρ. Note
that this characterisation does not rely on the set Q˜max to be nonempty.
Proposition 4.16. Assume Πρ0 = {0} and Q satisfies Condition I. If Q ∩M = ∅, then the
market (S0, S) admits regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
Proof. Condition I implies that the set CQ in (4.2) is convex. If Q ∩M = ∅ then 0 /∈ CQ. By
the supporting hyperplane theorem (cf. [9, Proposition B.12]), there exists pi ∈ Rd \ {0} with
pi · c ≤ 0 for all c ∈ CQ. By (4.3),
ρ(Xpi) = sup
c∈CQ
(pi · c) ≤ 0,
and the claim follows from Proposition 4.15.
We are now in a position to state and prove the main result of this paper, the dual charac-
terisation of regulatory arbitrage.
Theorem 4.17. Suppose Πρ0 = {0}, Q satisfies Condition I and Q˜max 6= ∅. Then the following
are equivalent:
(a) The market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
(b) Q˜ ∩ P 6= ∅ for some ∅ 6= Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfying Conditions POS, MIX and INT.
(c) Q˜ ∩ P 6= ∅ for all ∅ 6= Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfying Conditions POS, MIX and INT.
Proof. (b) =⇒ (a). Let ∅ 6= Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfying Conditions POS, MIX and INT and pi ∈ Rd\{0}.
By Proposition 4.15, we have to show that ρ(Xpi) > 0. Let Z˜ ∈ Q˜ ∩ P. Then E[−Z˜Xpi] = 0.
Since Xpi 6= 0 by nonredundancy of the market, this implies that Xpi is a non-constant random
variable. Now the claim follows from Lemma B.3.
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(a) =⇒ (c). We argue by contraposition. So assume that there exists ∅ 6= Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfying
Conditions POS, MIX and INT such that Q˜∩P = ∅. This implies that Q˜∩M = ∅ by Condition
POS. Refining the argument of Proposition 4.16, it suffices to show that 0 is not in the interior
of CQ. Seeking a contradiction, assume that 0 ∈ CoQ. Then there is ε > 0 such that B(0, ε) ⊂ Q,
where B(0, ε) denotes the open ball of of radius ε > 0 around 0 with respect to some norm ‖ · ‖.
Set
CQ˜ := {E[−Z(R− r1)] : Z ∈ Q˜} ⊂ CQ ⊂ Rd.
Then CQ˜ is convex by Remark 4.6(a) and does not contain the origin because Q˜ ∩ M = ∅.
Hence, B(0, ε) 6⊂ CQ˜. As Q˜ 6= ∅, there is x ∈ CQ˜. Set y := −ε/(2‖x‖)x ∈ B(0, ε). Then
λx+ (1− λ)y = 0 for λ := ε/(2‖x‖+ ε). Letting Zx ∈ Q˜ and Zy ∈ Q denote Radon-Nikodým
derivatives corresponding to x and y, respectively, it follows from definition ofM in (4.8) and
Condition MIX that λZx + (1− λ)Zy ∈ Q˜ ∩M, in contradiction to Q˜ ∩M = ∅.
(c) =⇒ (b). This is trivial.
Remark 4.18. (a) While the proof of Theorem 4.17 is elementary, it is by no means trivial as
it relies on finding the “correct” conditions for the sets Q˜.
(b) If we choose for ρ the worst-case risk measure, we recover a refined version of the fun-
damental theorem of asset pricing in a one-period model; see Theorem 6.2 below for details. In
this case, the proof is particularly simple. For the nontrivial direction, the argument is – to the
best of our knowledge – new, even simpler than any of the existing proofs (cf. e.g. [23, Theorem
1.7]) and yields a much sharper result.
(c) If Q˜max = ∅, Theorem 4.17 fails. A concrete counterexample is given in Example A.6.
5 Coherent risk measures on Orlicz spaces
In this section, we discuss how the previous theory applies to the case where the returns lie in
some Orlicz space LΦ and ρ is finite valued on LΦ.
5.1 Key definitions and results on Orlicz spaces
We proceed to recall some key definitions and results relating to Orlicz spaces and Orlicz hearts;
see [45, Chapter 10] and [19, Chapter 2] for details.
• A function Φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞] is called a Young function if it is convex and satisfies
limx→∞Φ(x) =∞ and limx→0 Φ(x) = Φ(0) = 0. A Young function Φ is called superlinear
if Φ(x)/x→∞ as x→∞.20
• Given a Young function Φ, the Orlicz space corresponding to Φ is given by
LΦ := {X ∈ L0 : E[Φ(c|X|)] <∞ for some c > 0},
and the Orlicz heart is the linear subspace
HΦ := {X ∈ LΦ : E[Φ(c|X|)] <∞ for all c > 0}.
• LΦ and HΦ are Banach spaces under the Luxemburg norm given by
‖X‖Φ := inf
{
λ > 0 : E
[
Φ
(∣∣X
λ
∣∣)] ≤ 1} .
20Note that a Young function is continuous except possibly at a single point, where it jumps to ∞. Thus a
finite Young function is continuous.
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• For any Young function Φ, its convex conjugate Ψ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞] defined by
Ψ(y) := sup
x≥0
{xy − Φ(x)}
is also a Young function and its conjugate is Φ.
• If X ∈ LΦ and Y ∈ LΨ, we have the generalised Hölder inequality:
E[|XY |] ≤ 2‖X‖Φ‖Y ‖Ψ. (5.1)
• Using the conjugate Ψ and (5.1), we may define the Orlicz norm on LΦ by
‖X‖∗Ψ := sup{E[XY ] : Y ∈ LΨ, ‖Y ‖Ψ ≤ 1}.
This norm is equivalent to the Luxemburg norm on LΦ.
• When Φ jumps to infinity, then LΦ = L∞ (and ‖·‖Φ is equivalent to ‖·‖∞) and HΦ = {0}.
• When Φ is finite, the norm dual of the Orlicz heart (HΦ, ‖·‖Φ) (with the Luxemburg norm)
is the Orlicz space (LΨ, ‖·‖∗Φ) (with the Orlicz norm).
• Φ is said to satisfy the ∆2-property if there exists a finite constant K > 0 such that
Φ(2x) ≤ KΦ(x) for all x ∈ [0,∞). Φ satisfies the ∆2 property if and only if LΦ = HΦ.
5.2 Dual representation of coherent risk measures on Orlicz spaces
After these preparations, we consider the following setup: Let Φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞] be a Young
function and ρ : LΦ → R a coherent risk measure that is expectation bounded.21 We first
summarise criteria under which ρ admits a dual representation. To this end, we first need to
revisit the Fatou property from Definition 3.10.
Definition 5.1. Let Φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞] be a Young function and ρ : LΦ → (−∞,∞] a map.
Then ρ is said to satisfy the
• Fatou property on LΦ, if Xn → X P-a.s. for Xn, X ∈ LΦ and |Xn| ≤ Y P-a.s. for some
Y ∈ LΦ implies that ρ(X) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Xn).
• strong Fatou property on LΦ, if Xn → X P-a.s. for Xn, X ∈ LΦ and supn ‖Xn‖Φ < ∞
implies that ρ(X) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Xn).
The strong Fatou property implies the Fatou property but the converse is not true. Note,
however, that the two are equivalent if LΦ = L∞.
Remark 5.2. The notion of strong Fatou property has been introduced by Gao et al [24] who
noted in [25] that for a general normed vector space L, the Fatou property for risk measures
(which was originally only formulated on L∞) could either be understood in terms of order
bounded sequences (giving the Fatou property) or norm bounded sequences (giving the strong
Fatou property).
We proceed to summarize the existing dual representation results for (finite) coherent risk
measures on Orlicz spaces from the literature.22
Theorem 5.3. Let Φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞] be a Young function with conjugate Ψ and ρ : LΦ → R
a coherent risk measure. Then ρ admits a dual representation under the following conditions:
21If ρ admits a dual representation on LΦ, then it can be naturally extended to L1; see Remark 4.1(d).
22For Orlicz hearts, the representation result for (finite) coherent risk measures is given in [11, Corollary 4.2].
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(a) Φ satisfies the ∆2-condition.
(b) Ψ satisfies the ∆2-condition and ρ satisfies the Fatou property.
(c) Φ is a superlinear Young function and ρ satisfies the strong Fatou property.
Proof. (a) In this case LΦ = HΦ and the result follows from [11, Corollary 4.2].
(b) This follows from [24, Theorem 2.5] or [17, Proposition 2.5] and Fenchel–Moreau duality.23
(c) This follows from [16, Theorem 3.2] in the case that LΦ = L∞ and from [25, Theorem 2.4]
in the general case.
Remark 5.4. (a) If a coherent risk measure ρ : LΦ → R admits a dual representation, it is
straightforward to check that it satisfies the Fatou property. The converse is false if both Φ and
Ψ fail to satisfy the ∆2-condition; see [24, Theorem 4.2] for a generic counterexample.24
(b) A coherent risk measure that admits a dual characterisation does not need to satisfy the
strong Fatou property; in fact if Φ is a superlinear Young function and ρ : LΦ → R admits a
dual characterisation such that Qρ 6⊂ HΨ, then ρ fails to satisfy the strong Fatou property by
[25, Theorem 2.4].
Next, we show that all coherent risk measures on Orlicz spaces that satisfy a dual represen-
tation (independent of whether one of the conditions of Theorem 5.3 is satisfied) have a nice
maximal dual set.
Proposition 5.5. Let Φ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞] be a Young function with conjugate Ψ and ρ : LΦ → R
a coherent risk measure. If ρ admits a dual representation, then the maximal dual set Qρ is LΨ-
closed and LΨ-bounded if Φ is finite. If Φ satisfies the ∆2-condition, Qρ is also L1-closed.
Moreover, if Q ⊂ Qρ has LΨ-closure Qρ, then Q represents ρ, and if Q ⊂ Qρ represents ρ, then
Qρ ⊂ Q¯, where Q¯ denotes the L1-closure.
Proof. If Φ jumps to ∞, i.e., LΦ = L∞, then the result follows from [16, Theorem 3.2]. So
assume for the rest of the proof that Φ is finite. Denote by ρH the restriction of ρ to HΦ. Then
AρH ⊂ Aρ and hence QρH ⊃ Qρ. It follows from [11, Corollary 4.2] and Proposition B.5(a) that
QρH is LΨ-bounded and L1-closed. Hence, Qρ is LΨ-bounded. This together with the definition
of Qρ and the generalised Hölder inequality (5.1) implies that Qρ is LΨ-closed. If Φ satisfies
the ∆2-condition then AρH = Aρ and so Qρ = QρH is L1-closed. Moreover, if Q ⊂ Qρ has
LΨ-closure Qρ, then Q represents ρ by the generalised Hölder inequality (5.1) and if Q ⊂ Qρ
represents ρ, then Q¯ρ = Q¯ because otherwise by the Hahn-Banach separation theorem (for the
pairing (L∞, L1)), there exists X ∈ L∞ such that supZ∈Q¯ρ E [−ZX] 6= supZ∈Q¯ E [−ZX].
5.3 Dual characterisation of (strong) regulatory arbitrage on Orlicz spaces
We proceed to provide the dual characterisation of (strong) regulatory arbitrage for (finite)
expectation bounded coherent risk measures on Orlicz spaces.
We first consider the case LΦ = L∞, i.e., when Φ jumps to infinity, which is different from
all other Orlicz spaces in that the corresponding Orlicz heart is the null space.
Corollary 5.6. Let ρ : L∞ → R be an expectation bounded coherent risk measure on L∞ that
satisfies the Fatou property. Let Q ⊂ Qρ be a convex subset with 1 ∈ Q and Q¯ = Qρ. Suppose
that Ri ∈ L∞. If ρ is strictly expectation bounded, then Πρν is nonempty, compact and convex
for all ν ≥ 0. Moreover:
(a) If ρ is continuous from below, the market (S0, S) does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage
for ρ if and only if Qρ ∩M 6= ∅.
23Note that for “(4)⇒ (1)” in [24, Theorem 3.7], the assumption of an atomless probability space is not needed.
24Note, however, that ρ in [24, Theorem 4.2] is (−∞,∞]-valued.
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(b) If there exists Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfying Conditions POS, MIX and INT with 1 ∈ Q˜, then the
market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage for ρ if and only if Q˜ ∩ P 6= ∅.
Proof. The first assertion follows from Theorem 3.11 and Corollary 3.9. Next, since Ri ∈ L∞,
Condition UI is satisfied if and only if the dual set Q is uniformly integrable, which by [23,
Corollary 4.35] is equivalent to ρ being continuous from below. Since Q¯ = Qρ by Proposition
5.5, part (a) follows from Theorem 4.12. Finally, Condition I is trivially satisfied and so part
(b) follows from Theorem 4.17.
We now consider the case of Orlicz spaces for a finite Young function.
Corollary 5.7. Let Φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be a finite Young function with conjugate Ψ and
ρ : LΦ → R an expectation bounded coherent risk measure that admits a dual representation. Let
Q ⊂ Qρ be a convex subset with 1 ∈ Q and whose closure in LΨ is Qρ. Suppose that Ri ∈ LΦ.
If ρ is strictly expectation bounded, then Πρν is nonempty, compact and convex for all ν ≥ 0.
Moreover:
(a) If Ri ∈ HΦ, the market (S0, S) does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ if and only
if Q¯ρ ∩M 6= ∅.25
(b) If there exists Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfying Conditions POS, MIX and INT with 1 ∈ Q˜, then the
market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage for ρ if and only if Q˜ ∩ P 6= ∅.
Proof. The first assertion follows from Theorem 3.11 and Corollary 3.9. Next, since Ri ∈
HΦ, Condition UI is satisfied by Proposition B.5(b), and (a) follows from Proposition 5.5 and
Theorem 4.12. Finally, Condition I follows from Ri ∈ LΦ and the generalised Hölder inequality
(5.1). Now part (b) follows from Theorem 4.17.
6 Examples
In this section, we apply our main results to various examples of risk measures. Recall that we
have already investigated the case of elliptically distributed returns in Section 3.4. Here, we do
not make any assumptions on the returns, other than our standing assumptions that returns are
in L1 and that the market (S0, S) is nonredundant and nondegenerate.
6.1 Worst-case risk measure
The worst-case risk measure WC : L1 → (−∞,∞] is given by WC(X) := ess sup(−X). It is a
coherent risk measure and is – among others – represented by Q := D∩L∞; see Proposition B.6.
This implies that Condition I is satisfied. By contrast, Condition UI is not satisfied unless Ω is
finite. It is not difficult to check that Q˜ = {Z ∈ D∩L∞ : Z > 0 P-a.s.} satisfies conditions POS,
MIX and INT. However, it turns out that we get a stronger dual characterisation of regulatory
arbitrage for the worst-case risk measure if we consider the set
Qˆ := {Z ∈ D ∩ L∞ : Z ≥ ε P-a.s. for some ε > 0}.
It is easy to check that Qˆ satisfies Conditions POS, MIX and INT. Since 1 ∈ Qˆ, it follows from
Proposition 4.8 that ΠWC0 = {0}. Theorems 4.17 and 4.12 now give the following result.
Corollary 6.1. The market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage for WC if and only if
there is Z ∈ P ∩ L∞ with Z ≥ ε P-a.s. for some ε > 0. Moreover, if Ω is finite, the market
(S0, S) does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for WC if and only ifM 6= ∅.
25Here Q¯ρ denotes the closure of Qρ in L1.
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It is not difficult to check that (strong) regulatory arbitrage for WC is equivalent to ordinary
arbitrage of the first (second) kind for markets (S0, S) that satisfy our standing assumptions.
Indeed, recall that the market (S0, S) is said to admit an
• arbitrage of the first kind if there exists a trading strategy (ϑ0, ϑ) ∈ R1+d such that
ϑ0S00 + ϑ · S0 ≤ 0, ϑ0S01 + ϑ · S1 ≥ 0 P-a.s. and P[ϑ0S01 + ϑ · S1 > 0] > 0.
• arbitrage of the second kind if there exists a trading strategy (ϑ0, ϑ) ∈ R1+d such that
ϑ0S00 + ϑ · S0 < 0, and ϑ0S01 + ϑ · S1 ≥ 0 P-a.s.
Now if (ϑ0, ϑ) ∈ R1+d is an arbitrage of the first (second) kind, then pi := (ϑ1S10 , . . . , ϑdSd0) 6= 0
satisfies Xpi = pi · (R− r1) = (ϑ0S01 +ϑ ·S1)− (1 + r)(ϑ0S00 +ϑ ·S0), which implies that WC(Xpi)
is nonpositive (negative). Hence, the market satisfies (strong) regulatory arbitrage for WC by
Proposition 4.15 (4.9). The converse direction can be argued similarly.
Using this equivalence, Corollary 6.1 gives the following refined version of the one-period
fundamental theorem of asset pricing for L1-markets (with trivial initial information). The
refinement is that we show the existence of an EMM with a positive lower bound.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose that the market (S0, S) has finite first moments.26
(a) The market does not admit arbitrage of the first kind if and only if there exists Z ∈ P∩L∞
with Z ≥ ε P-a.s. for some ε > 0.
(b) If Ω is finite, the market does not admit arbitrage of the second kind if and only ifM 6= ∅.
Remark 6.3. To the best of our knowledge, a simple proof for the existence of an EMM with
positive lower bound for arbitrage-free L1-markets (with trivial initial information) has not been
given before. In fact, the only extant result that we are aware of that gives this lower bound
for L1-markets is [41, Corollary 2], which uses very heavy machinery from functional analysis.27
By contrast our proof is elementary and short, and might even be given in a classroom setting.
It follows from the above discussion that if the market (S0, S) satisfies no-arbitrage, then
it does not satisfy (strong) regulatory arbitrage for the worst-case risk measure. We now ad-
dress the question if there exists a positive homogeneous (not necessarily convex or expectation
bounded) risk measure ρ such that regulatory arbitrage (or at least strong regulatory arbitrage)
for ρ can be ruled out if the market satisfies no-arbitrage. The following result shows that the
answer is negative.
Theorem 6.4. Let ρ be a positively homogeneous risk measure that is not as conservative as
the worst-case risk measure. Then there exists a market (S0, S) that satisfies no-arbitrage but
admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ.
Proof. We are going to construct a random variable R with E [R] > 0 and P[R < 0] > 0 and
ρ(R) < 0. Define the market (S0, S) by S0 ≡ 1 and S := S1, where S10 = 1 and S11 = 1 + R.
Then (S0, S) is nonredundant, nondegenerate, and arbitrage-free but admits strong regulatory
arbitrage for ρ by Proposition 4.9 (with pi = 1).
First, if ρ is not expectation bounded, there exists X ∈ L1 such that E[−X]−ρ(X) := ε > 0.
By cash-invariance of ρ, this implies that X cannot be constant so ess sup(−X+E[X]) > 0. Set
δ ∈ (0, ess sup(−X +E[X])) and let R := X − E[X] + δ. Then E[R] = δ > 0, P[R < 0] > 0 and
ρ(R) = −ε− δ < 0.
Next, if ρ is expectation bounded, there exists X ∈ L1 such that ρ(X) < ess sup(−X) ≤ ∞.
Let m ∈ (ρ(X), ess sup(−X)) and R := X + m. Then P[R < 0] > 0, ρ(R) < 0 and E[R] ≥
−ρ(R) > 0 by expectation boundedness of ρ.
26Note that if (S0, S) has finite first moments, we may assume without loss of generality that it is nonredundant,
nondegenerate and satisfies Si0 > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
27Under stronger integrability conditions on the market, the result has also been established by [35, Remark 7.5].
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6.2 Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall
We have already introduced VaR and ES in Definition 3.2. Since VaR has no dual representation,
we cannot apply the results from Section 4. However, using VaRα(X) ≤ ESα(X) for α ∈ (0, 1)
andX ∈ L1, it follows that if there is (strong) regulatory arbitrage for ESα, then there is (strong)
regulatory arbitrage for VaRα.
Unlike VaR, ES is coherent and admits for α ∈ (0, 1) the following dual representation:28
ESα(X) = sup
Z∈Qα
E[−ZX] = max
Z∈Qα
E[−ZX], where Qα := {Z ∈ D : ‖Z‖∞ ≤ 1α}. (6.1)
This can be extended to include α ∈ {0, 1}, where Q0 := D∩L∞ and Q1 := {1} only “contains”
the real-word measure P. Note that ES1(X) = E[−X];29 ES0 corresponds to the worst-case risk
measure considered in Section 6.1, where the supremum in (6.1) is no longer attained.
For α ∈ (0, 1), Conditions I and UI are satisfied for ESα and Qα is closed in L1. Moreover,
Proposition B.7 shows that
Q˜α := {Z ∈ D : Z > 0 P-a.s. and ‖Z‖∞ < 1α} (6.2)
satisfies Conditions POS, MIX and INT. Note that 1 ∈ Q˜α. Using Proposition 4.8 together with
Theorems 4.12 and 4.17,30 we arrive at the following complete description of mean-ES portfolio
selection:
Theorem 6.5. Fix α ∈ (0, 1). ΠESαν is nonempty, compact and convex for ν ≥ 0. Moreover:
(a) The market (S0, S) does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for ESα if and only if there
exists Z ∈M such that ‖Z‖∞ ≤ 1α .
(b) The market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage for ESα if and only if there exists
Z ∈ P such that ‖Z‖∞ < 1α .
Remark 6.6. It straightforward to check that
Qˆα := {Z ∈ D : there exists ε > 0 such that Z ≥ ε P-a.s. and ‖Z‖∞ < 1α} (6.3)
is nonempty and satisfies Conditions POS, MIX and INT. Thus, Theorem 6.5(b) can be strength-
ened: The market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage for ESα if and only if there exists
Z ∈ P with Z ≥ ε P-a.s. for some ε > 0 and ‖Z‖∞ < 1α .
6.3 Spectral risk measures
Spectral risk measures are mixtures of Expected Shortfall risk measures that were introduced
by Acerbi in [1]. Here, we follow the definition of Cherny [13], who has studied their finer
properties in great detail. For a probability measure µ on ([0, 1],B[0,1]), the spectral risk measure
ρµ : L1 → (−∞,∞] with respect to µ is given by
ρµ(X) :=
∫
[0,1]
ESα(X)µ(dα).
Remark 6.7. (a) If µ does not have an atom at 0, we can define the non-increasing function
φµ : [0, 1] → R+ by φµ(u) :=
∫
[u,1]
1
α µ(dα) and write ρ
µ(X) :=
∫ 1
0 φ
µ(u)VaRu(X) du. This is
28See e.g. [23, Theorem 4.47] (which extends to the case X ∈ L1).
29For this risk measure, it is clear that the set of optimal portfolios for any ν ≥ 0 is given by Πν , and ESν = −ν.
Hence by Theorem 3.19, the market admits strong regulatory arbitrage for ES1.
30Also note that ESα1 <∞ because ESα is real-valued.
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the original definition of Acerbi [1]. Some explicit examples for the choice of µ (or more precisely
φµ) are given in [18].
(b) It was shown in [30, Theorem 7] for the domain L∞ that on a standard probability space
where P is non-atomic, spectral risk measures coincide with law-invariant, comonotone, coherent
risk measure that satisfy the Fatou property. It was then shown in [27] that the Fatou property
is automatically satisfied by law-invariant coherent risk measures. The result has then been
generalised to L1 by [34, Theorem 2.45].
Spectral risk measures admit a dual representation. It follows from [13, Theorem 4.4] that
the maximal dual set Qρµ is L1-closed and given by
Qρµ =
{∫
[0,1]
ζα µ(dα) : ζα(ω) is jointly measurable and ζα ∈ Qα for all α ∈ [0, 1]
}
,
where Qα is as in (6.1). Here, we consider an L1-dense subset of Qρµ given by
Qµ =
{∫
[0,1]
ζα µ(dα) : ζα(ω) is jointly measurable and there is 1 > ε > 0
such that ζα ∈ Qα for α ∈ [0, 1− ε] and ζα ≡ 1 for α ∈ (1− ε, 1]
}
.
It is shown in Proposition B.8(a) that Qµ also represents ρµ. If µ does not have an atom at 0
and
∫
(0,1]
1
α µ(dα) <∞, it follows that Qµ (and Qρµ) is bounded in L∞. Hence, ρµ is real-valued
and Condition I and UI are satisfied.
If µ does not have an atom at 1, it follows from Proposition B.8(b) that the set
Q˜µ =
{∫
[0,1)
ζα µ(dα) : ζα(ω) is jointly measurable and there is 0 < ε < 1 and 0 < δ < ε1−ε
such that ζα ∈ Q˜α(1+δ) for α ∈ [0, 1− ε] and ζα ≡ 1 for α ∈ (1− ε, 1)
}
,
where Q˜α(1+δ) is as in (6.2), satisfies Conditions POS, MIX and INT. Note that 1 ∈ Q˜µ. Using
Proposition 4.8 together with Theorems 4.12 and 4.17 we arrive at the following result:
Corollary 6.8. Let µ be a probability measure on ([0, 1],B[0,1]) such that µ({0}) = 0 and∫
(0,1]
1
α µ(dα) <∞. Then Πρ
µ
ν is nonempty, compact and convex for ν ≥ 0. Moreover:
(a) The market (S0, S) does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for ρµ if and only if there
exists Z ∈M such that Z = ∫[0,1] ζα µ(dα), where ζα(ω) is jointly measurable and satisfies
ζα ∈ D and ‖ζα‖∞ ≤ 1α .
(b) If µ does not have an atom at 1, the market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage
for ρµ if and only if there exists Z ∈ P, 0 < ε < 1 and 0 < δ < ε1−ε such that Z =
µ((1− ε, 1)) + ∫[0,1−ε] ζα µ(dα), where ζα(ω) is jointly measurable and satisfies ζα ∈ D and
‖ζα‖∞ ≤ 1α(1+δ) for α ∈ [0, 1− ε].
6.4 g-entropic risk measures
The class of g-entropic risk measures was introduced by Ahmadi-Javid [3, Definition 5.1]. It is
best understood when presented in the context of Orlicz spaces. Let Φ : [0,∞)→ R be a finite
superlinear Young function and Ψ its conjugate. Let g : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be a convex function
that dominates Ψ. For β > g(1), define the risk measure ρg,β : LΦ → R by31
ρg,β(X) = sup
Z∈Qg,β
E[−ZX], where Qg,β := {Z ∈ D : E[g(Z)] ≤ β},
31Note that our definition slightly differs from the definition in [3], who considers the domain L∞ and assumes
that g is convex, (−∞,∞]-valued and satisfies g(1) = 0.
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and call it the g-entropic risk measure with divergence level β. By convexity and nonnegativity of
g and the fact that g dominates Ψ, it follows that Qg,β is convex, LΨ-bounded and L1-closed.32
By Proposition 5.5, we may deduce that Qg,β = Qρg,β . Moreover, Proposition B.9 shows that
Q˜g,β := {Z ∈ D : Z > 0 P-a.s. and E[g(Z)] < β}
satisfies Conditions POS, MIX and INT. Note that 1 ∈ Q˜g,β ⊂ Qg,β . Applying Corollary 5.7,
we get the following result:
Corollary 6.9. Let Φ : [0,∞) → R be a superlinear finite Young function with conjugate Ψ,
g : [0,∞) → [0,∞) a convex function that dominates Ψ and β > g(1). Suppose that Ri ∈ LΦ.
Then Πρ
g,β
ν is nonempty, compact and convex for all ν ≥ 0. Moreover:
(a) If Ri ∈ HΦ, the market (S0, S) does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for ρg,β if and
only if there is Z ∈M with E [g(Z)] ≤ β.
(b) The market (S0, S) does not admit regulatory arbitrage for ρg,β if and only if there is Z ∈ P
with E [g(Z)] < β.
We finish this section, by providing two specific examples of g-entropic risk measures.
6.4.1 Transformed norm risk measure
Let p ∈ (1,∞) and α ∈ (0, 1).33 Define the transformed Lp-norm risk measure with sensitivity
parameter α as
ρ(X) := min
s∈R
{ 1α‖(s−X)+‖p − s}, X ∈ Lp.
It is shown in [11, Section 5.3] that this is a real-valued coherent risk measure on Lp and admits
the dual representation with
Qρ = {Z ∈ D : ‖Z‖q ≤ 1α},
where q := p/(p−1). Hence ρ = ρg,β , where Φ(x) = xp/p, Ψ(y) = yq/q, g = Ψ and β := ( 1α)q/q.
6.4.2 Entropic value at risk
The entropic value at risk (EVaR) was introduced in Ahmadi-Javid [3] and further studied in [4].
Consider the Young function Φ(x) = exp(x) − 1 and fix α ∈ (0, 1). Then the entropic value at
risk at level α is a risk measure on LΦ given by34
EVaRα(X) := inf
z>0
{
1
z
log
(
E
[
exp(−zX)
α
])}
.
It is shown in [4, Section 4.4] that it admits a dual representation with dual set
Q := {Z ∈ D : E[Z log(Z)] ≤ − log(α)}.
Hence, EVaRα = ρg,β , where Ψ(y) = (y log(y) − y + 1)1{y≥1}, g(y) = y log(y) − y + 1 and
β := − log(α).
32More precisely, ‖Z‖Ψ ≤ max(1, β) for all Z ∈ Qg,β and L1-closedness follow from Fatou’s lemma.
33The case p = 1 corresponds to Expected Shortfall, see Section 6.2.
34Note that the parametrisation in [4] is different: α is replaced by 1− α and X by −X.
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7 Conclusion and outlook
It has been said (cf. [12]) that there have been three major revolutions in finance: the first one
was Markowitz’ mean-variance analysis [32], which led to the CAPM of Treynor, Sharpe, Lintner
and Mossin; the second revolution was the Black-Scholes-Merton formula; and the third one was
the theory of coherent risk measures developed by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath [8]. In this
paper, we have endeavoured to link the first and third revolution by substituting the variance
in classical portfolio selection with a positively homogeneous risk measure ρ.
We have shown that under mild assumptions, ρ-optimal portfolios for a fixed return exist.
However, contrary to what many people seem to take for granted, ρ-efficient portfolios may fail
to exist. We referred to this situation as regulatory arbitrage. The first aim of this paper has
been to make regulators aware of this pitfall, which in a sense is a generalisation of arbitrage of
the first kind.
The second aim of this paper has been to explain why this complication arises and how
to avoid it. The fundamental theorem of asset pricing states that the market does not satisfy
arbitrage of the first kind (i.e., does not admit regulatory arbitrage for the the worst-case risk
measure) if and only if P∩L∞ 6= ∅. Our main result, Theorem 4.17, extends this. We have shown
that for coherent risk measures under mild assumptions on the dual set Q, the market does not
admit regulatory arbitrage for ρ if and only if P ∩ Q˜ 6= ∅ for some nonempty Q˜ ⊂ Q satisfying
properties POS, MIX and INT. We have also demonstrated that Q˜ can be computed explicitly
for a large variety of risk measures. Furthermore, we have shown that amongst markets that do
not admit arbitrage (of the first kind), regulatory arbitrage for ρ cannot be excluded unless ρ
is the worst-case risk measure. Since a worst-case approach to risk is infeasible in practise, this
shows that regulators cannot avoid the existence of (strong) regulatory arbitrage when imposing
a positively homogeneous risk measure.
Going back to the two question posed in the introduction, we see that it is certainly possible
for ES constraints to be ineffective. The root of this issue stems specifically from positive homo-
geneity. Therefore, if there is an alternative superior risk measure, it cannot be coherent. Nat-
urally, this leads to the following questions regarding convex, but not positively homogeneous,
measures of risk: Do optimal portfolios exist? Does (strong) regulatory arbitrage occur? If so,
can we give a dual characterisation? We intend to return to these question in a subsequent
publication.
A Counterexamples
In this appendix, we give several counterexamples to complement the results in Sections 3 and 4.
Example A.1. In this example we show that if all assumptions of Theorem 3.11 hold, but
{0} ( Πρ0, the result fails.
Let Ω = [−5, 5]× [1, 7] ⊂ R2 with the Borel σ-algebra and the uniform probability measure
P. Let r = 0 and assume there are two risky assets with returns Ri(ω) := ωi for ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω
and i ∈ {1, 2}. Let C be the closed ball of radius 2 centred at (2, 4), and for each (x, y) ∈ C, let
C(x,y) be the closed ball of radius 1 centred at (x, y), and Z(x,y) the Radon-Nikodým derivative
of the uniform probability measure on C(x,y) with respect to P. Define the risk measure ρ via
its dual set
Q = {Z(x,y) : (x, y) ∈ C},
and note that E[Z(x,y)R1] = x and E[Z(x,y)R2] = y. For this financial market (that is nonredun-
dant and nondegenerate), E[R1] = 0, E[R2] = 4, and Π1 = {(pi1, pi2) : pi1 ∈ R, pi2 = 1/4}. Thus,
for every pi ∈ Π1 and (x, y) ∈ C,
E[−Z(x,y)Xpi] = −pi · (x, y) = −(pi1x+ 14y).
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It follows that for any pi ∈ Π1,
ρ(Xpi) = sup
(x,y)∈C
−(pi1x+ 14y) = 12
√
16(pi1)2 + 1− 2pi1 − 1 =: g(pi1).
Therefore, ρ1 = inf{ρ(Xpi) : pi ∈ Π1} = inf{g(pi1) : pi1 ∈ R} = −1 is not attained, since g is
strictly decreasing. Thus, Πρ1 is empty, even though ρ satisfies the Fatou property and ρ1 ∈ R.
The reason Theorem 3.11 fails is because Πρ0 = {(pi1, pi2) : pi1 ≥ 0, pi2 = 0} ) {0}.
For the rest of the counterexamples, we take Ω = [0, 1], with the Borel σ-algebra and the
Lebesgue measure P. In each example, the financial market is nonredundant and the risky
returns are integrable and nondegenerate. Moreover, we always have 1 ∈ Q.
Example A.2. In this example we show that when Condition I is not satisfied, the set CQ from
(4.2) may fail to be convex and (4.3) may break down.
Suppose r = 0 and there are two risky assets with returns
R1(ω) :=
{
3√
ω
, if ω < 116 ,
− 815 , if ω ≥ 116 ,
and R2(ω) :=
{
− 1√
ω
, if ω < 116 ,
24
15 , if ω ≥ 116 .
Let Q := {λY + (1− λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]}, where
Y (ω) :=
{
2√
ω
, if ω < 116 ,
0, if ω ≥ 116 .
Note that E[−R1] = E[−R2] = −1, E[−Y R1] = −∞ and E[−Y R2] =∞. Thus, Π1 = {(pi1, pi2) :
pi1 + pi2 = 1}, and for any pi = (pi1, pi2) ∈ Π1,
Xpi(ω) =
{
4pi1−1√
ω
, if ω < 116 ,
8
15(3− 4pi1), if ω ≥ 116 ,
and so ρ(Xpi) =

E[−Y Xpi] =∞, if pi1 < 14 ,
E[−Y Xpi] = 0, if pi1 = 14 ,
E[−ZXpi] = −1, if pi1 > 14 .
It follows that
sup
c∈CQ
(pi · c) = max{−1,−∞pi1 +∞pi2}.
Thus, CQ is not a convex subset of R2 and (4.3) does not hold.
Example A.3. In this example we show the converse of Proposition 4.16 fails.
Let r = 0 and assume there is one risky asset whose return R1 is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1]. Let ρ be the worst-case risk measure, cf. Section 6.1. Then Condition I is satisfied,
Q ∩M = ∅ (becauseM = ∅), but ρ(Xpi) ≥ 0 for any portfolio pi. Therefore, by Theorem 3.19,
this market does not admit strong regulatory for ρ, even though Q∩M = ∅.
Example A.4. In this example we show that when Q is uniformly integrable but RQ is not,
Theorem 4.12 may fail.
Let the risk-free rate be given by r = 1 + 12c, where c :=
∫ 1/3
1/4 log(1/x) dx. Suppose there is
one risky asset whose return is given by
R1(ω) =

ln
(
1
ω
)
, if ω < 13 ,
0, if ω ∈ [13 , 23 ],
−1, if ω > 23 .
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Next, for n ≥ 4, set
Zn(ω) =

n
ln(1/ω) , if ω <
1
n ,
0, if ω ∈ [ 1n , 14 ],
kn, if ω ∈ (14 , 13 ],
0, if ω > 13 ,
where kn is chosen so that E[Zn] = 1. Note that kn ↑ 12, and that Zn converges in L1 to
Z = 121(1/4,1/3]. Therefore, (∪n≥4{Zn}) ∪ {Z} is uniformly integrable, and whence, if we let Q
be the L1-closed convex hull of (Zn)n≥4, Z and 1, it will also be uniformly integrable. Moreover,
E[ZnR] = 1 + knc ↑ 1 + 12c but E[ZR] = 12c.
It follows that the set CQ is given by
CQ = {E[−Y (R− r)] : Y ∈ Q} = (0, d],
where d := E[−(R − r)] > 1. Thus Condition I is satisfied, Q is uniformly integrable and
Q¯ ∩M = Q∩M = ∅, but the market does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ:
ρ(Xpi) = sup
c∈CQ
(pi · c) ≥ 0, for any portfolio pi ∈ R.
Example A.5. In this example we show that when RQ is uniformly integrable but Q is not,
Theorem 4.12 may fail.
Let r = 0 and suppose there is one risky asset whose return is given by
R1(ω) =

1, if ω ≤ 14 ,
0, if ω ∈ (14 , 34),
−12 , if ω ≥ 34 .
For n ≥ 2, define the intervals An := (12 , 12 + 12n ) and set
Zn(ω) =

2n − 1n , if ω ∈ An,
0, if ω ∈ (14 , 34) \An,
kn, if ω ∈ [0, 14 ] ∪ [34 , 1],
where kn is chosen so that E[Zn] = 1. Note that kn ↓ 0. Let Q be the closed convex hull of
(Zn)n≥2 and 1. Then Q is not uniformly integrable but RQ is. Moreover, E[R] = 18 , E[ZnR] =
1
2kn ↓ 0 and 12k2 < 18 . It follows that
CQ = {E[−Z(R− r)] : Z ∈ Q} = [−18 , 0).
Thus Q¯ ∩M = Q∩M = ∅, but the market does not admit strong regulatory arbitrage for ρ:
ρ(Xpi) = sup
c∈CQ
(pi · c) ≥ 0, for any portfolio pi ∈ R.
Example A.6. In this example we show that when Q˜max = ∅, Theorem 4.17 fails.
Consider the financial market described in Example A.5. Let Q be the convex hull of the
two densities 1 and Y (ω) = 21(1/2,1](ω),
Q = {µY + (1− µ) : µ ∈ [0, 1]}.
Then E[Y R] = −14 and E[R] = 18 , so CQ = [−18 , 14 ] and there is no regulatory arbitrage.
However, Q˜ ∩ P = ∅ because Q˜max = ∅. Indeed, any Z ∈ Q is of the form
Z(ω) =
{
1− µ, if ω ≤ 12 ,
1 + µ, if ω > 12 ,
for some µ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore if Z ∈ Q and λ > 0, then λZ+(1−λ)Z˜ ∈ Q for some Z˜ ∈ D∩L∞
implies that Z˜ ∈ Q and since Q is not dense in D ∩ L∞, the result follows.
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B Additional results
Proposition B.1. For Q ⊂ D, set L1(Q) := {X ∈ L0 : lima→∞ supZ∈Q E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}] = 0}.
If Q is UI and X ∈ L1, the following are equivalent:
(a) X ∈ L1(Q)
(b) XQ is UI.
Proof. First assume that XQ is uniformly integrable. Then, for any a > 0 and Z ∈ Q,
E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}] = E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}1{Z≤1}] + E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}1{Z>1}]
≤ E[|X|1{|X|>a}] + E[Z|X|1{Z|X|>a}].
Taking the supremum over Q on both sides, letting a → ∞ and using that X ∈ L1 and XQ is
UI yields
lim
a→∞ supZ∈Q
E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}] ≤ lim
a→∞E[|X|1{|X|>a}] + lima→∞ supZ∈QE[Z|X|1{Z|X|>a}] = 0.
Conversely, assume that X ∈ L1(Q). For any a, b > 0 and Z ∈ Q,
E[Z|X|1{Z|X|>a2}] ≤ E[Z|X|1{Z>a}] + E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}]
≤ E[Z|X|1{Z>a}1{|X|≤b}] + E[Z|X|1{Z>a}1{|X|>b}] + E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}]
≤ bE[Z1{|Z|>a}] + E[Z|X|1{|X|>b}] + E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}].
Taking the supremum overQ on both sides, letting a→∞ and using thatQ is UI andX ∈ L1(Q)
yields
lim
a→∞ supZ∈Q
E[Z|X|1{Z|X|>a}] ≤ sup
Z∈Q
E[Z|X|1{|X|>b}].
Now, the result follows when letting b→∞ and using again that X ∈ L1(Q).
Proposition B.2. Suppose Condition UI is satisfied.
(a) The set Q¯ and RiQ¯ for i ∈ {1, . . . , d} are uniformly integrable.
(b) The Rd-valued map F : Q¯ → Rd given by F (Z) = E[−Z(R− r1)] is weakly continuous.
Proof. (a) Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. The Dunford-Pettis theorem implies that Q¯ and RiQ are UI. It
suffices to show that RiQ¯ ⊂ RiQ. So let Z ∈ Q¯. Then there exists a sequence (Zn)n∈N ⊂ Q
such that Zn converges to Z in L1 and hence in probability. It follows that RiZn converges to
RiZ in probability and hence also in L1 as (RiZn)n∈N ⊂ RiQ is UI. It follows that RiZ ∈ RiQ.
(b) Since F (λZ1 + (1 − λ)Z2) = λF (Z1) + (1 − λ)F (Z2) for Z1, Z2 ∈ Q¯ and λ ∈ [0, 1],
preimages under F of convex sets are convex. Since Q¯ is convex as Q is convex, it therefore
suffices to show that F is strongly continuous. So let (Zn)n∈N ⊂ Q¯ be a sequence that converges
to Z in L1 and hence in probability. Then −Zn(Ri − r) converges to −Z(Ri − r) in probability
and hence also in L1 by part (a) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Lemma B.3. Assume Q˜ ⊂ D satisfies Conditions POS and INT. Let Z˜ ∈ Q˜ and X ∈ L1 be a
non-constant random variable. If E[−Z˜X] = 0, then there exists Z ∈ Q such that E[−ZX] > 0.
Proof. Note that Z˜ > 0 P-a.s. by Condition POS. Define Q˜ ≈ P by dQ˜dP := Z˜ and A := {X < 0}.
Since X is non-constant and EQ˜ [X] = 0, it follows that Q˜[A] ∈ (0, 1). Seeking a contradiction,
suppose that E[−ZX] ≤ 0 for all Z ∈ Q. Let E be an L∞-dense subset of D∩L∞ corresponding
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to Z˜ in Condition INT. Let Z ′ ∈ E . Then there exists λ > 0 such that λZ ′ + (1 − λ)Z˜ ∈ Q.
Thus, Since Z ′ was chosen arbitrarily, we may deduce that
sup
Z∈E
(E[−ZX]) ≤ 0,
which together with Proposition B.6 below implies that X ≥ 0 P-a.s. Since Q˜ ≈ P, it follows
that Q˜[A] = 0 and we arrive at a contradiction.
Proposition B.4. Let Φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞] be a Young function. Let (Yn)n∈N be a sequence in
LΦ that converges in probability to some random variable Y . Then
‖Y ‖Φ ≤ lim inf
n→∞ ‖Yn‖Φ.
Proof. Set K := lim infn→∞ ‖Yn‖Φ. We may assume without loss of generality that K < ∞.
After passing to a subsequence, we may assume without loss of generality that (Yn)n∈N converges
to Y P-a.s. If Φ jumps to infinity, then ‖ · ‖Φ is equivalent to ‖ · ‖∞ and the result follows. So
assume that Φ is finite and hence continuous. For any ε > 0, we can pass to a further subsequence
and assume without loss of generality that ‖Yn‖Φ ≤ K + ε for all n. Then by the definition of
the Luxemburg norm, E[Φ(|Yn/(K + ε)|)] ≤ 1 for all n. Fatou’s lemma gives
E
[
Φ
(∣∣∣ YK+ε ∣∣∣)] ≤ lim infn→∞ E [Φ(∣∣∣ YnK+ε ∣∣∣)] ≤ 1.
This implies that ‖Y ‖Φ ≤ K + ε. By letting ε→ 0, we conclude that ‖Y ‖Φ ≤ K.
Proposition B.5. Let Φ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be a finite Young function with conjugate Ψ. Let
ρ : HΦ → R be a coherent risk measure. Denote by Qρ the maximal dual set. Then
(a) Qρ is L1-closed and LΨ-bounded.
(b) If R ∈ HΦ, then RQρ is uniformly integrable.
Proof. (a) It follows from [11, Corollary 4.2] that Qρ ∩ LΨ is LΨ bounded and represents ρ. It
suffices to show that Qρ∩LΨ is L1-closed. Indeed, this implies that Qρ ⊂ LΨ because otherwise,
by the Hahn-Banach separation theorem (for the pairing (L1, L∞)), there exists X ∈ L∞ such
that supZ∈Qρ∩LΨ E [−ZX] < supZ∈Qρ E [−ZX], in contradiction to the fact that both Qρ ∩ LΨ
and Qρ represent ρ on L∞.
Set K := supZ∈Qρ‖Z‖Ψ < ∞. Let (Zn)n≥1 be a sequence in Qρ ∩ LΨ that converges to
Z ∈ L1. Then Z ∈ D and ‖Z‖Ψ ≤ K by Proposition B.4. Let X ∈ Aρ ⊂ HΦ. We have to show
that E [ZX] ≥ 0. Since E[ZnX] ≥ 0 by the fact that Zn ∈ Qρ ∩ LΨ, it suffices to show that
E[ZX] = limn→∞ E[ZnX]. For any n ∈ N and an > 0, the generalised Hölder inequality (5.1)
yields
|E[ZnX]− E[ZX]| ≤ E[|X||Zn − Z|] = E[|X||Zn − Z|1{|X|>an}] + E[|X||Zn − Z|1{|X|≤an}]
≤ E[|X|Zn1{|X|>an}] + E[|X|Z1{|X|>an}] + an‖Zn − Z‖1
≤ (2K + 2K)‖X1{|X|>an}‖Φ + an‖Zn − Z‖1. (B.1)
Now if we choose an := min(n, 1√‖Zn−Z‖1 ) and let n→∞, the right hand side of (B.1) converges
to 0 by order continuity of of HΦ (see e.g. [19, Theorem 2.1.14]).
(b) First, consider the case that R = 1. If Φ is not superlinear, then Ψ jumps to infinity,
and hence Qρ is L∞-bounded by part (a) and therefore UI. If Φ is superlinear (and finite), then
Ψ is superlinear and finite. Set K := supY ∈Q‖Y ‖Ψ < ∞ and define the superlinear function Ψ˜
by Ψ˜(y) := Ψ(y/K). By the definition of the Luxenbourg norm,
E[Ψ˜(Y )] = E[Ψ(Y/K)] ≤ 1, for all Y ∈ Qρ.
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This implies supY ∈Qρ E[Ψ˜(Y )] ≤ 1 <∞. Since Ψ˜ is superlinear, the de la Vallée-Poussin theorem
implies that Qρ is UI.
Next, assume that R ∈ HΦ. By Proposition B.1, it is enough to show that R ∈ L1(Qρ)
where
L1(Qρ) := {X ∈ L0 : lim
a→∞ supZ∈Qρ
E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}] = 0}.
Since R ∈ HΦ, the generalised Hölder inequality and order continuity of HΦ give
lim
a→∞ supZ∈Q
E[Z|X|1{|X|>a}] ≤ lim
a→∞ 2 supZ∈Q
‖Z‖Ψ‖X1{|X|>a}‖Φ = 0.
Proposition B.6. Let E be an σ(L∞, L1)-dense subset of D ∩ L∞.35 Then for all X ∈ L1.
sup
Z∈E
E[−ZX] = WC(X).
Proof. Define the coherent risk measure ρ : L1 → (−∞,∞] by ρ(X) := supZ∈E(E[−ZX]). To
show that ρ = WC, let X ∈ L1 and set c := ess sup(−X) = WC(X).
First, assume that c < ∞. Then monotonicity of the expectation gives ρ(X) ≤ WC(X).
For the reverse inequality, let ε > 0 and set Z := 1{−X≥c−ε}/P[−X ≥ c − ε] ∈ D ∩ L∞. Then
E[−ZX] ≥ c − ε. Since E is σ(L∞, L1)-dense in D ∩ L∞, there exists a net (Zi)i∈I in E which
converges to Z in σ(L∞, L1). Thus,
ρ(X) ≥ lim
i∈I
E [−ZiX] = E [−ZX] ≥ c− ε = WC(X)− ε.
Letting ε→ 0 yields ρ(X) ≥WC(X).
Finally, assume that c = ∞. Let N > 0 be given and set XN := max(X,−N). Then
XN ≥ X and WC(XN ) = N . By monotonicity of ρ and the first part,
ρ(X) ≥ ρ(XN ) = WC(XN ) = N.
Letting N →∞ yields ρ(X) =∞ = WC(X).
Proposition B.7. Fix α ∈ (0, 1). Then Q˜α := {Z ∈ D : Z > 0 P-a.s. and ‖Z‖∞ < 1α} is a
nonempty subset of Qα satisfying Conditions POS, MIX and INT.
Proof. It is clear that 1 ∈ Q˜α ⊂ Qα, and by definition Q˜α satisfies POS. If Z ∈ Qα, Z˜ ∈ Q˜α
and λ ∈ (0, 1), then λZ + (1− λ)Z˜ > 0 P-a.s., and by the triangle inequality
‖λZ + (1− λ)Z˜‖∞ ≤ λ‖Z‖∞ + (1− λ)‖Z˜‖∞ < 1α ,
so Q˜α satisfies Condition MIX. To show Condition INT, let Z˜ ∈ Q˜α. Set E := D ∩ L∞ and let
Z ∈ E . Since ‖Z‖∞ <∞ and ‖Z˜‖∞ < 1α there is λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λ‖Z˜‖∞+(1−λ)‖Z‖∞ ≤ 1α .
By the triangle inequality it follows that λZ˜ + (1− λ)Z ∈ Qα.
Proposition B.8. Assume µ is a probability measure on ([0, 1],B[0,1]) and ρµ the corresponding
spectral risk measure.
(a) ρµ is represented by
Qµ =
{∫
[0,1]
ζα µ(dα) : ζα(ω) is jointly measurable and there is 1 > ε > 0
such that ζα ∈ Qα for α ∈ [0, 1− ε] and ζα ≡ 1 for α ∈ (1− ε, 1]
}
.
35Note that D ∩ L∞ is σ(L∞, L1)-closed.
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(b) If µ does not have an atom at 1, the set
Q˜µ =
{∫
[0,1)
ζ˜α µ(dα) : ζ˜α(ω) is jointly measurable and there is ε ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, ε1−ε)
such that ζ˜α ∈ Q˜α(1+δ) for α ∈ [0, 1− ε] and ζ˜α ≡ 1 for α ∈ (1− ε, 1)
}
,
is nonempty and satisfies Conditions POS, MIX and INT.
Proof. (a) It follows from [13] that ρµ is represented by
Qρµ =
{∫
[0,1]
ζα µ(dα) : ζα(ω) is jointly measurable and ζα ∈ Qα for all α ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
Let Z =
∫
[0,1] ζα µ(dα) ∈ Qρµ . Set Zn :=
∫
[0,1−1/n] ζα µ(dα) + µ((1− 1/n, 1]) ∈ Qµ. Then
lim
n→∞ ‖Zn − Z‖∞ ≤ limn→∞
n
n− 1µ((1− 1/n, 1)) = 0.
This implies that E [−ZX] = limn→∞ E [−ZnX] for all X ∈ L1.
(b) Since 1 ∈ Q˜β for all β ∈ [0, 1) and Q˜β only contains positive random variables, it follows
that 1 ∈ Q˜µ and Condition POS is satisfied.
To show Condition MIX, let Z ∈ Qµ, Z˜ ∈ Q˜µ and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then there is ε ∈ (0, 1) and
δ ∈ (0, ε1−ε) such that Z =
∫
[0,1−ε] ζα µ(dα)+µ((1−ε, 1)) and Z˜ =
∫
[0,1−ε] ζ˜α µ(dα)+µ((1−ε, 1)),
where ζα ∈ Qα and ζ˜α ∈ Q˜α(1+δ) for α ∈ [0, 1−ε]. Set δ′ := δ(1−λ)1+δλ ∈ (0, δ). A simple calculation
shows that λζα + (1− λ)ζ˜α ∈ Q˜α(1+δ′) for all α ∈ [0, 1− ε]. Thus,
λZ + (1− λ)Z˜ =
∫
[0,1−ε]
λζα + (1− λ)ζ˜α µ(dα) + µ((1− ε, 1)) ∈ Q˜µ.
Finally, to show Condition INT, let Z˜ ∈ Q˜µ and set
E :=
{∫
[0,1)
ζα µ(dα) : ζα(ω) is jointly measurable and there is 1 > γ, ε > 0 such that
ζα ∈ Qγ for α ∈ [0, 1− ε] and ζα ≡ 1 for α ∈ (1− ε, 1)
}
.
It is straightforward to check that E is a dense subset of D ∩ L∞. Let Z ∈ E . Then there
exists ε, γ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, ε1−ε) such that Z˜ =
∫
[0,1−ε] ζ˜α µ(dα) + µ((1 − ε, 1)) and Z =∫
[0,1−ε] ζα µ(dα) + µ((1 − ε, 1)), where ζ˜α ∈ Q˜α(1+δ) and ζα ∈ Qγ for α ∈ [0, 1 − ε]. Set
λ′ := δγ(2+δ)(1+δ−γ) ∈ (0, 1). A simple calculation shows that λ′ζα + (1− λ′)ζ˜α ∈ Q˜α(1+δ/2) for all
α ∈ [0, 1− ε]. Thus,
λ′Z + (1− λ′)Z˜ =
∫
[0,1−ε]
λ′ζα + (1− λ′)ζ˜α µ(dα) + µ((1− ε, 1)) ∈ Q˜µ ⊂ Qµ.
Proposition B.9. Let g : [0,∞)→ R be a convex function and β > g(1). Let Qg,β := {Z ∈ D :
E[g(Z)] ≤ β}. Then Q˜g,β := {Z ∈ D : Z > 0 P-a.s. and E[g(Z)] < β} is nonempty and satisfies
Conditions POS, MIX and INT.
Proof. It is clear that Q˜g,β satisfies Condition POS and 1 ∈ Q˜g,β since β > g(1). To show
condition MIX, let Z ∈ Qg,β , Z˜ ∈ Q˜g,β and λ ∈ (0, 1). By the convexity of g,
E[g(λZ˜ + (1− λ)Z)] ≤ E[λg(Z˜) + (1− λ)g(Z)] = λE[g(Z˜)] + (1− λ)E[g(Z)] < β.
To show Condition INT, let Z˜ ∈ Q˜g,β . Set E := D ∩L∞ and let Z ∈ E . Since E[g(Z)] <∞ and
E[g(Z˜)] < β there is λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λE[g(Z˜)] + (1 − λ)E[g(Z)] ≤ β. Now convexity of g
implies that λZ˜ + (1− λ)Z ∈ Qg,β .
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